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Reasonable Factors Other Than Age: The Emerging 
Specter of Ageist Stereotypes 
Judith J. Johnson† 
It is beyond question that ageism plays a particularly pernicious 
role in the workplace.  Older workers face widely held societal ste-
reotypes that they are cognitively, socially, and performatively defi-
cient in the workplace.  They are also the targets of ageist attitudes, 
ageist communication, and age discrimination.1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In spite of two recent Supreme Court cases that ostensibly rein-
stated a more expansive interpretation of discrimination under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), the protection that the 
ADEA affords still faces the same danger that threatened it before these 
decisions.  The courts, including the Supreme Court, have been allowing 
employers to interpose defenses that correlate so strongly with age that 
they can be used as thinly veiled covers for discrimination.2  If the Court 
is serious about enforcing the purpose of the ADEA, it must interpret the 
“reasonable factor other than age” (RFOA) defense to protect older em-
ployees from discrimination by requiring employers to justify adverse 
actions that use age-correlative criteria such as greater seniority,3 higher 
position4 or salary,5 higher healthcare costs,6 proximity to retirement,7 or 
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 1. Robert McCann and Howard Giles, Ageism in the Workplace: A Communication Perspec-
tive, in AGEISM STEREOTYPING AND PREJUDICE AGAINST OLDER PERSONS 188 (Todd D. Nelson ed., 
MIT Press 2002). 
 2. See infra Part V.B.2. 
 3. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 242–43 (2005). 
 4. Id. 
 5. See, e.g., Townsend v. Weyerhaeuser Co., No. 04-563, 2005 WL 1389197, at *13 (W.D. 
Wis. June 13, 2005). 
 6. Id.  It should be noted that the employer may provide less in healthcare benefits for older 
workers.  See infra note 71. 
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retirement status.8  The ADEA was designed to preclude consideration of 
these factors, or at least to require that they be closely scrutinized.9 
The problem is that the courts, including the Supreme Court, have 
not come to grips with what “reasonable” means for RFOA purposes.  At 
this point, the courts seem to be interpreting “reasonable” to be whatever 
the employer wants it to mean, without reference to the effect on the pro-
tected class.  It surely cannot be reasonable to apply factors that have 
such an obvious impact on older workers without justifying the need for 
burdening the protected class in particular.  An employer-showing that 
less discriminatory alternatives were not feasible is the usual method of 
showing that a factor was reasonable.  In fact, without a showing that 
alternatives were not feasible, the employer must have been aware of a 
substantial risk that he would be adversely affecting the protected class; 
in other words, the employer must have been acting recklessly with re-
gard to whether he was engaging in discrimination.10  The ADEA im-
poses liquidated damages on employers who act recklessly, so reckless-
ness is already a state of mind punished by the Act.11  The employer is 
acting recklessly when he is subjectively aware of a substantial risk that 
he will be discriminating against the protected class.12  This article ar-
gues that if the employer is acting with a sufficiently culpable state of 
mind with regard to whether the criterion treats the protected class unfa-
vorably, he should not be able to interpose the criterion itself as a reason-
able method of achieving his goals, without further justification.13  For 
example, employer actions based on seniority are usually reasonable 
unless more senior employees are adversely affected.  If the employer 
uses greater seniority as the criterion for a layoff, for instance, he should 
have to explain why he did not use a criterion with a less obvious impact 
on the protected class. 
In Smith v. City of Jackson, the Supreme Court agreed that the 
ADEA was designed to attack practices that have a disparate impact on 
older employees, unless such practices are justified by a “reasonable fac-
tor other than age.”14  The Court has also decided that RFOA15 is an af-
                                                                                              
 7. See, e.g., Silver v. Leavitt, No. 05-0968, 2006 WL 626928 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2006). 
 8. See, e.g., Rollins v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 06-081, 2006 WL 3302538 (S.D. Tex. 
Nov. 13, 2006). 
 9. See infra text accompanying notes 147–56. 
 10. See infra Part VI. 
 11. See infra Part II. 
 12. See infra text accompanying notes 282-83.. 
 13. See infra Part VI. 
 14. 544 U.S. 228, 253 (2005). 
 15. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).  See infra note 71 for the full text of the provi-
sion. 
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firmative defense, as to which the employer bears the burden of persua-
sion;16 however, the Court has indicated that RFOA will not be difficult 
to prove,17 and lower courts are so holding.18 
Prior to these recent Supreme Court cases, but after a case decided 
by the Court in 1993, Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins,19 lower courts began 
restricting protections previously afforded by the ADEA.  Although most 
of these restrictions have been removed, the meaning of the RFOA de-
fense has not been resolved.20 
The most serious obstacle to proving discrimination was the lower 
courts’ refusal to apply the disparate impact theory to the ADEA.  Thus, 
the plaintiff was limited to the disparate treatment theory of discrimina-
tion,21 which is more difficult to prove.22  This limitation was removed in 
Smith v. City of Jackson, in which the Supreme Court decided that the 
disparate impact theory applies to the ADEA.23  The Court, however, 
went further and decided that RFOA would be the defense to disparate 
impact, which was an issue that had not been presented.24  The Court 
further held, with little analysis, that the employer’s justification was an 
                                           
 16. Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 128 S. Ct. 2395 (2008). 
 17. See infra text accompanying notes 99, 130–31. 
 18. See infra Part V.B.2.  Determining when RFOA should be interposed as a defense, other 
than in disparate impact cases, is beyond the scope of this article.  As I discuss in two other articles 
on the RFOA defense, whenever the employee presents substantial proof of discrimination, such as 
when an employer uses age-correlated criteria, he should have to bear the burden of persuasion to 
show RFOA.  Judith J. Johnson, Rehabilitate the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Resusci-
tate the “Reasonable Factors Other Than Age” Defense and the Disparate Impact Theory, 55 
HASTINGS L. J. 1399, 1430 (2004) [hereinafter Rehabilitate]; Judith J. Johnson, Semantic Cover for 
Age Discrimination: Twilight of the ADEA, 42 WAYNE L. REV. 1, 64–68 (1995) [hereinafter Seman-
tic Cover].  The employer should also have to bear the burden of persuasion to prove RFOA in cases 
of widespread disparate treatment similar to pattern or practice cases.  See Rehabilitate, supra, for an 
explanation of these theories. 
 19. 507 U.S. 604 (1993).  See infra text accompanying notes 83–86 for a discussion of the 
case. 
 20. Of the four common court-imposed restrictions, the first was refusing to apply the disparate 
impact theory to the ADEA, thus limiting proof of discrimination to disparate treatment.  Second, 
those courts that continued to apply the disparate impact theory to the ADEA failed to recognize that 
the defense to disparate impact should not be a watered-down version of business necessity, but 
RFOA.  Third, most courts applying disparate impact, whatever defense they applied, assigned the 
burden of persuasion to the plaintiff throughout the case.  Fourth, factors that obviously correlated 
with age were no longer considered impermissible but were actually accepted as defenses to the 
ADEA.  The first three of these restrictions have been removed; however, the fourth restriction, 
allowing a selection criterion that correlates with age to be a defense, has not been resolved and 
makes recent plaintiffs’ victories fairly meaningless. 
 21. See infra text accompanying notes 87–91. 
 22. See Mack A. Player, Wards Cove Packing or Not Wards Cove Packing?  That Is Not the 
Question: Some Thoughts on Impact Analysis Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 31 
U. OF RICH. L. REV. 819, 831 (1997). 
 23. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005). 
 24. Id. at 239. 
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RFOA that precluded liability.25  Subsequently, in Meacham v. Knolls 
Atomic Power Laboratory, the Court decided that RFOA is an affirma-
tive defense, as to which the employer bears the burden of persuasion, 
but the Court gratuitously noted that it may make little difference in the 
outcome.26  However, neither of these cases answered what has become 
an important question in age discrimination: What does RFOA mean?  
No arguments were presented in either City of Jackson or Meacham re-
garding the meaning of RFOA,27 and there was no reference to any au-
thority on the meaning of RFOA.28  Consequently, the Court’s unex-
plained pronouncement in City of Jackson that the defendant’s justifica-
tion was reasonable leaves the meaning of RFOA uncertain.29  Before 
Meacham, the lower courts generally put the burden of persuasion on the 
employee and required very little to establish RFOA.  The lower courts 
were responding to City of Jackson, and the result was that disparate im-
pact cases under the ADEA were bound to fail.30  Even though the Court 
decided in Meacham that the employer bears the burden of persuasion to 
show RFOA,31 the Court insinuated in both cases that RFOA would not 
be difficult for the employer to prove.32 
Therefore, for the purpose of this article, this question is presented: 
How difficult will it be to prove RFOA?  If the employer may interpose 
any defense that does not discriminate on its face against older employ-
ees, RFOA will mean nothing more than “legitimate non-discriminatory 
reason,” which is the defense to disparate treatment.33  A “legitimate 
non-discriminatory reason” is “any” factor other than age.  Allowing the 
employer to use unjustified age-correlated factors gives “reasonable fac-
tors other than age” little meaning beyond “any” factor other than age, an 
interpretation precluded by the Court in recent decisions.34  Nevertheless, 
the lower courts have failed to scrutinize the meaning of “reasonable-
ness” for RFOA purposes.35  This article examines the possibilities and 
concludes that “reasonable” must include an employer-justification of 
any factor that has an obvious impact on older workers, such as seniority, 
higher salary, or any of the factors cited above.  Despite recent Supreme 
                                           
 25. Id. at 241–42. 
 26. 128 S. Ct. 2395, 2404 (2008).  See infra text accompanying notes 130–31. 
 27. See infra notes 95, 130, 137. 
 28. See Meacham, 128 S. Ct. at 2403; City of Jackson, 544 U.S. at 242–43. 
 29. See infra Part III.C. 
 30. See infra Part V.B.2. 
 31. Meacham, 128 S. Ct. at 2402. 
 32. See infra text accompanying notes 99, 130–31. 
 33. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 34. See infra Part III. 
 35. See infra Part V.B. 
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Court plaintiffs victories, unless courts interpret RFOA to forbid the un-
justified use of age-correlated factors, the result will be the same for 
plaintiffs: Age-stereotyping will continue unabated. 
Both the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and 
the Department of Labor, the agencies interpreting the ADEA, have al-
ways equated RFOA with factors that are shown to predict success in the 
job.36  As Justice Scalia pointed out, City of Jackson was a perfect case 
for deferring to the agencies’ interpretation of the ADEA.37  The early 
judicial interpretations of the ADEA were consistent with the EEOC and 
Department of Labor’s understanding of RFOA38 and showed that factors 
that were “inherently time-based, such as experience, years on the job, 
and tenure . . . [were] inherently age-related and thus [could not] be con-
sidered ‘factors other than age.’”39 
The danger of inherently age-related factors is that many superfi-
cially reasonable employer practices negatively impact older employees 
and make it difficult for them to obtain and retain employment.40  For 
example, in a reduction in force, if the employer decides to cut costs by 
eliminating higher-salaried workers, this inevitably has a negative impact 
on older workers who have been employed longer and benefited from 
raises over the years.  If the older worker is then laid off, he may have 
difficulty obtaining new employment because he is considered overquali-
fied and, to match his former salary, overpaid.41  Being able to use the 
disparate impact theory to prove that a higher-salary justification ad-
versely impacts older employees and putting the burden of persuasion on 
the employer to show RFOA does not alleviate the problem.  Disparate 
impact discrimination occurs when the employer uses an unjustified neu-
tral employment practice that has a disparate impact on a protected 
class.42  If the employer may interpose higher salary as an RFOA, the 
older worker is no better protected than he was before City of Jackson 
and Meacham.  While saving money is clearly a reasonable goal, the 
employer should not be able to defend the disparate impact on older em-
ployees by interposing as an RFOA a method of achieving that goal if it 
                                           
 36. See infra text accompanying notes 150–52.  The Department of Labor was originally re-
sponsible for administering the ADEA.  The EEOC has the current responsibility.  See infra note 
151. 
 37. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 243 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 38. See infra text accompanying notes 147–156. 
 39. Mack A. Player, Title VII Impact Analysis Applied to the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act: Is A Transplant Appropriate?, 14 U. TOL. L. REV. 1261, 1278 (1983).  Professor Player 
also thought that RFOA, as defined here, should be the defense to disparate impact cases under the 
ADEA.  Id. at 1278–83. 
 40. See Rehabilitate, supra note 18, at 1400. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430–31 (1971). 
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obviously correlates with age without justifying the use of such a factor.  
In order to use a factor such as eliminating higher-paid workers, the em-
ployer should have to explain why that factor was used instead of a fac-
tor with a less obvious impact on the protected class. 
When Congress passed the ADEA, it recognized that the number of 
unemployed older people in the workforce was becoming a serious prob-
lem and that this problem was caused in large part by age discrimina-
tion.43  Acting on the assumption that disabilities caused by the aging 
process affected job performance and should be valid disqualifications, 
Congress created the RFOA defense.44  Current research challenges the 
assumption that age-related incapacity is prevalent, and consequently, 
Congress may have been acting on incorrect assumptions regarding older 
people when it passed the ADEA.45 
Since Congress enacted the ADEA in 1967, social scientists have 
extensively studied the phenomenon of age discrimination.  A new un-
derstanding of ageism should now figure into the development of the law 
of RFOA.46  Social scientists have concluded that although most people 
will live well into “old age,” older people are a category against which 
younger people are generally prejudiced.47  Older people are no longer 
seen as fonts of wisdom; rather, they are seen as less competent, even if 
endearing and warm.48  These prejudices lead to older people being 
                                           
 43. 29 U.S.C. § 621(a) (1988). 
 44. See Steven J. Kaminshine, The Cost of Older Workers, Disparate Impact, and the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act, 42 FLA. L. REV. 229, 301–02 (1990). 
 45. See infra notes 53–57.  Age discrimination was not included in Title VII because it was 
“different.”   See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005), where the Court recognized that 
Congress’s decision to limit the coverage of the ADEA by including the RFOA provision 
is consistent with the fact that age, unlike race or other classifications protected by Title 
VII, not uncommonly has relevance to an individual’s capacity to engage in certain types 
of employment.  To be sure, Congress recognized that this is not always the case, and that 
society may perceive those differences to be larger or more consequential than they are in 
fact.  However, as Secretary Wirtz noted in his report, “certain circumstances . . . unques-
tionably affect older workers more strongly, as a group, than they do younger workers.”  
Wirtz Report 11.  Thus, it is not surprising that certain employment criteria that are rou-
tinely used may be reasonable despite their adverse impact on older workers as a group.  
Moreover, intentional discrimination on the basis of age has not occurred at the same lev-
els as discrimination against those protected by Title VII.  While the ADEA reflects Con-
gress’ intent to give older workers employment opportunities whenever possible, the 
RFOA provision reflects this historical difference. 
Id. at 241. 
 46. See McCann & Giles, supra note 1, at 198. 
 47. See Becca R. Levy & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Ageism, AGEISM, supra note 1, at 49. 
 48. Amy J.C. Cuddy & Susan T. Fiske, Doddering but Dear: Process, Content, and Function 
in Stereotyping of Older Persons, AGEISM, supra note 1, at 9–10.  The authors attribute this phe-
nomenon to modernization that has increased the size of the older population; retirement, which has 
removed older people from prestigious jobs; technological advances that have produced jobs that 
older people are not trained for; urbanization that has divided younger people from older family 
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viewed less positively in interviews and thus being less likely to be hired.  
They are seen as less trainable, resistant to change, less promotable, and 
likely to perform less ably.49  Experts have found that the origin of this 
prejudice against old people is in large part based on a fear of our own 
mortality.50  In addition, the authors of these studies note the stereotypi-
cal views that older workers should retire and make way for the young 
fuel stereotypical attitudes and discrimination.51  Because the negative 
attitudes about older people are not based on a strong hatred, negative 
views of older people are more acceptable.52 
The surprising fact is that most generalizations about the effects of 
aging are unfounded.  Numerous studies have found that brain activity in 
healthy people does not differ substantially between ages twenty and 
eighty.  The only major change in intellectual capacity is in speed and 
reaction time.  “Nevertheless, stereotypical beliefs about the mental dec-
rements of older individuals are ubiquitous and well-documented in the 
research literature.”53  Additionally, “[i]n contrast to widely held stereo-
types that depict older workers as chronically absent and injury prone, 
the research literature on absenteeism and workplace injuries suggests 
quite a different story.”54  With regard to the stereotypes that older work-
ers are unable to cope with change, literature shows that older workers 
are comparable to younger workers in their ability to be re-trained.55  
Also, several studies show a nonexistent or even slightly positive correla-
tion between age and job performance.56 
Now that social scientists have refuted the assumption that many 
common age distinctions are accurate,57 it is interesting to note that the 
ADEA itself was based on inaccurate stereotypes.  Age discrimination 
                                                                                              
members; and public education, which has removed the need for the wise elder to pass on the cul-
ture.  Id. at 12–13. 
 49. Id. at 18. 
 50. Id. at 1.  See Jeff Greenberg, Jeff Schimel & Andy Martens, Ageism: Denying the Face of 
the Future, AGEISM, supra note 1, at 27, for a complete discussion of this cause of age discrimina-
tion. 
 51. McCann & Giles, supra note 1, at 176. 
 52. Levy & Banaji, supra note 47, at 50–51.  See Joann M. Montepare & Leslie A. Zebrowitz, 
A Social-Developmental View of Ageism, AGEISM, supra note 1, at 77, for a discussion of how these 
attitudes developed. 
 53. McCann & Giles, supra note 1, at 167. 
 54. Id. at 169.  Studies have found a negative or insignificant correlation between age and 
absenteeism.  Employers rate older employees more highly in terms of reliability and dependability.  
Id. at 169–70.  The studies show a tradeoff in on-the-job accidents: younger workers are more acci-
dent-prone, while older workers take longer to recover.  Id. at 170. 
 55. Id. at 171–72. 
 56. Id. at 172.  Output of older employees has been found to be equal to younger employees, 
and older workers are more accurate and steadier in their performance.  Id. 
 57. Id. 
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has long been considered less invidious than other forms of discrimina-
tion.58  To the contrary, it is more insidious because it is more accept-
able.59  Thus, courts must scrutinize common age-correlated factors more 
closely.  In the midst of a recession with layoffs and plummeting retire-
ment accounts,60 discrimination against older people will be even more 
devastating. 
This article will examine the possible meanings of “reasonable fac-
tors other than age” and suggest a solution.  Part II will briefly describe 
the ADEA generally.  Part III will examine the recent Supreme Court 
cases that have addressed RFOA.  Part IV will explore the possible 
meanings of RFOA by reviewing the hierarchy of employment discrimi-
nation defenses.  Part V will fit RFOA into the hierarchy and investigate 
recent judicial interpretations.  Part VI will explain the solution, which is 
to require employers to justify criteria that obviously impact older work-
ers, such as seniority and higher salary.  Part VII will conclude. 
II.  THE PASSAGE OF THE ADEA, ITS PROVISIONS AND 
INTERPRETATIONS 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination 
based on race, sex, religion, color and national origin.61  The ADEA was 
passed shortly after Title VII took effect.  During the Title VII debates, 
Congress pondered including age as a prohibited basis for discrimination 
but decided instead to refer the issue of age discrimination to the Secre-
tary of Labor for study.62  In response, the Secretary issued what came to 
be known as the “Wirtz Report,”63 in which he noted the seriousness of 
the age-discrimination problem.64  The report led to the passage of the 
ADEA in 1967.65 
                                           
 58. See Kaminshine, supra note 44, at 306–07. 
 59. See supra text accompanying note 52. 
 60. Jennifer Levitz & Philip Shishkin, More Workers Cite Age Bias After Layoffs, WALL ST. J., 
Mar. 11, 2009, at D1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123673216882289971.html; see 
also Peter S. Goodman, Jack Healy, & David Stout, Job Losses Hint at Vast Remaking of U.S. Econ-
omy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2009, at A1, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/07/business/economy/07 
jobs.html 
 61. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq (1989 & Supp. 1995). 
 62. See 110 CONG. REC. 2596–99; 9911–13; 13,490–92 (1964). 
 63. Michael Bentley, Note, How American Employers (Almost) Learned to Respect Their Eld-
ers: Smith v. City of Jackson and the Availability of the Disparate Impact Theory Under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act, 26 MISS. C. L. REV. 347, 350 (2007). 
 64. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER, AGE DISCRIMINATION IN 
EMPLOYMENT, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR TO THE CONGRESS UNDER SECTION 715 OF 
THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (1965). 
 65. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 8 Stat. 602 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.). 
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The ADEA prohibits employment discrimination based on age 
against persons over the age of forty.66  The language of the ADEA’s 
central prohibition was taken word for word from Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964.67  Thus, the ADEA, on its face, provides the same 
basic protections from discrimination based on age that Title VII pro-
vides based on race, sex, religion, color, and national origin.68  The prin-
cipal differences between the two acts are in the remedial provisions and 
some of the defenses. 
The ADEA’s remedial provisions were drawn not from Title VII, 
but from the Fair Labor Standards Act, which provide for liquidated 
damages for willful violations.69  An employer engages in a willful viola-
tion when he is reckless with regard to whether he is violating the 
ADEA.70  Some defenses to the ADEA71 are also available under Title 
                                           
 66. Id. at  602, 607.  The ADEA originally protected persons ages forty to sixty-five.  The 
upper age limit was removed in 1986.  Age Discrimination in Employment Amendments of 1986, 
Pub. L. No. 99-592, § 2(c), 100 Stat. 3342, 3342. 
 67. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 233–34 (2005) (citing Lorillard v. Pons, 434 
U.S. 575, 584 (1978)). 
 68. Compare Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 8 Stat. 602 
(codified as amended in scattered Sections of 29 U.S.C.) with Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
2000e et seq., 2000e–2(a) (1989 & Supp. 1995).  The ADEA provides: 
It shall be unlawful for an employer: 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual or otherwise discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age. 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would de-
prive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or other-
wise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s 
age. 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 8 Stat. 602 (codified as 
amended in scattered Sections of 29 U.S.C.).  “Except for substitution of the word ‘age’ for the 
words ‘race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,’ the language of that provision in the ADEA is 
identical to that found in § 703(a)(2) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).”  City of Jackson, 
544 U.S. at 233. 
 69. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1990).  The Su-
preme Court has held that the violation is willful if “the employer . . . knew or showed reckless 
disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by the ADEA.”  Trans-World Air-
lines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 125 (1985). 
 70. See infra text accompanying notes 260–62. 
 71. The defenses provide in pertinent part: 
It shall be unlawful for an employer, employment agency, or labor organization— 
(1) to take any action otherwise prohibited under subsections (a), (b), (c), or 
(e) of this section where age is a bona fide occupational qualification reasona-
bly necessary to the normal operation of the particular business, or where the 
differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age, or where such 
practices involve an employee in a workplace in a foreign country, and com-
pliance with such subsections would cause such employer, or a corporation 
controlled by such employer, to violate the laws of the country in which such 
workplace is located; 
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VII.72 However, the ADEA contains additional defenses not found in 
Title VII.  An employer may defend against an ADEA claim by showing 
its actions were based on “reasonable factors other than age,” were pur-
suant to a bona fide benefit plan, or constituted discipline or discharge 
for good cause.73 
Although the Court has considered differences between the statutes 
to be significant,74 because of the similarities, Title VII has often served 
as a source of interpretation for the ADEA,75 and vice versa.76  Under 
Title VII, the Supreme Court identified two theories of discrimination: 
                                                                                              
(2) to take any action otherwise prohibited under subsection (a), (b), (c) or (e) 
of this section— 
(A) to observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system that is not in-
tended to evade the purposes of this Act, except that no such seniority 
system shall require or permit the involuntary retirement of any indi-
vidual specified by section 12(a) of this Act because of the age of such 
individual; or 
(B) to observe the terms of a bona fide employee benefit plan— 
(i) where, for each benefit or benefit package, the actual amount 
of payment made or cost incurred on behalf of an older worker 
is no less than that made or incurred on behalf of a younger 
worker, as permissible under section 1625.10, Title 29, Code of 
Federal Regulations (as in effect on June 22, 1989); or 
(ii) that is a voluntary early retirement incentive plan consistent 
with the relevant purpose or purposes of this Act.  Notwith-
standing clause (i) or (ii) of subparagraph (B), no such em-
ployee benefit plan or voluntary early retirement incentive plan 
shall excuse the failure to hire any individual, and no such em-
ployee benefit plan shall require or permit the involuntary re-
tirement of any individual specified by section 12(a) of this Act, 
because of the age of such individual. An employer, employ-
ment agency, or labor organization acting under subparagraph 
(A), or under clause (i) or (ii) of subparagraph (B), shall have 
the burden of proving that such actions are lawful in any civil 
enforcement proceeding brought under this chapter; or 
(3) to discharge or otherwise discipline an individual for good cause. 
29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
 72. 42 U.S.C., § 2000e-2(e), (h) (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1988).  The Bona Fide Occu-
pational Qualification (“BFOQ”) defense is not absolute under Title VII but applies only to sex, 
religious, and national origin discrimination, not to race or color.  Id. § 2(e). 
There are defenses under Title VII that are also not contained in the ADEA, such as action taken 
pursuant to a merit system or a system that measures quantity or quality of production or a profes-
sionally developed test.  Id. § 2(h). 
 73. See supra note 71 for full text of defenses. 
 74. See Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 128 S. Ct. 2395, 2406 (2008), Smith v. City of 
Jackson, 540 U.S. 228, 240 (2005). 
 75. See Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400 (1985); Monce v. City of San Diego, 
895 F.2d 560, 561 (9th Cir. 1990); MACK A. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 517 
(1988); Kaminshine, supra note 44, at 231. 
 76. See, e.g., Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 611 (1993).  The Supreme Court again 
approved this proposition in the City of Jackson case, discussed below.  City of Jackson, 544 U.S. at 
233–34. 
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disparate impact and disparate treatment.77  Disparate treatment discrimi-
nation occurs when the employer intentionally treats persons of different 
protected classes differently.78  Disparate impact discrimination occurs 
when the employer uses an unjustified neutral employment practice that 
has a disparate impact on a protected class.79  Courts originally applied 
both theories to the ADEA;80 however, controversy arose regarding 
whether the disparate impact theory rightly applied.81  Other questions 
arose as well: (1) If disparate impact applied to the ADEA, would the 
business necessity defense apply, as under Title VII, or would RFOA 
apply, as under the ADEA but not Title VII?  (2) Should the employer 
bear the burden of persuasion to prove the defense?  (3) If the defense is 
RFOA, what employer justifications would be considered reasonable?  
The Court resolved the first two of these issues in two cases: Smith v. 
City of Jackson and Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, de-
scribed in the next part.  Some background is useful first. 
Until 1993, courts consistently interpreted the ADEA in line with 
Title VII in regard to disparate impact.82  However, in Hazen Paper v. 
Biggins in 1993, the Court created confusion as to the meaning of RFOA 
when it said that the defense to discrimination under the ADEA was any 
factor other than age, without referring to the RFOA defense.83  This 
could be interpreted to mean that the disparate impact theory did not ap-
ply to the ADEA, even though the Court said it was addressing inten-
tional discrimination, not disparate impact.84  Hazen Paper was a dispa-
rate treatment case in which the plaintiff contended that being discharged 
to prevent his pension from vesting was intentional discrimination based 
on age.85  The Court said that pension-vesting and age, while correlated, 
were not perfectly correlated; as a result, the plaintiff had to prove more 
                                           
 77. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).  See also McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (constructing the burden and order of proof in an inten-
tional discrimination case). 
 78. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). 
 79. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. at 431. 
 80. See Rehabilitate, supra note 18, at 1408–09.  After Hazen Paper, the courts ceased to apply 
the disparate impact theory to the ADEA.  See City of Jackson, 544 U.S. at 236–37; see infra text 
accompanying notes 87–91.  However, City of Jackson recognized that the theory does apply to the 
ADEA.  See Part III.A. 
 81. See Semantic Cover, supra note 18, at 48–52. 
 82. See City of Jackson, 544 U.S. at 236–37. 
 83. 507 U.S. 604, 611 (1993) (finding that the employer is not guilty of intentional discrimina-
tion under the ADEA if his decision “is wholly motivated by factors other than age . . . even if the 
motivating factor is correlated with age, as pension status typically is”). 
 84. Id. at 611. 
 85. Id. at 609. 
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than the mere fact that he was discharged because his pension was about 
to vest.86 
Despite the Court’s clearly stating that it was not deciding whether 
disparate impact applied to the ADEA,87 the lower courts clutched at 
language from Hazen Paper to hold that disparate impact did not apply 
under the ADEA.88  Lower courts also found further support in the con-
currence to Hazen Paper, which opined that there were substantial argu-
ments why disparate impact did not apply under the ADEA.89  Neither 
the issue of the meaning of RFOA nor disparate impact was argued in 
Hazen Paper.90  Nevertheless, after Hazen Paper, most lower courts held 
that the disparate impact theory did not apply to the ADEA.91 
In the 2005 case of Smith v. City of Jackson, the Court decided that 
the disparate impact theory applies under the ADEA and that RFOA is 
the defense, but that the burdens of proof articulated in Wards Cove v. 
Atonio also apply to the ADEA.92  From this and other loose language in 
City of Jackson, most lower courts considering the issue held that a 
plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion to refute RFOA.93  In addition, 
courts also decided that almost any employer justification would suffice 
to establish RFOA,94 even though the issue of RFOA had not been pre-
sented in City of Jackson.95  Subsequently, in the 2008 case Meacham v. 
Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, the Court decided that the employer 
bears the burden of persuasion to prove RFOA.96  These two cases are 
discussed in the following part. 
                                           
 86. Id. at 611–12. 
 87. Id. at 610. 
 88. See Rehabilitate, supra note 18, at 1416 n.101. 
 89. 507 U.S. at 618 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 90. Id. at 610. 
 91. See Rehabilitate, supra note 18, at 1416 n.101. 
 92. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005).  See infra text accompanying notes 
198–201 for a discussion of Wards Cove. 
 93. See Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 128 S. Ct. 2395, 2400 (2008). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Brief of Petitioner at *3, Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005) (No. 03-1160), 
2004 WL 1369172.  The Petitioners argued that City of Jackson did not address any issue beyond 
whether disparate impact claims are ever cognizable under the ADEA.  Id.  The case presented no 
questions relating to the elements of a disparate impact claim, the defenses that might be available to 
employers, or the allocation of burdens of proof between the parties.  Id.  The Petitioners argued that 
the lower courts can and should address those issues in the first instance, consistent with Congress’s 
intent that the statute should be given practical construction.  Id. 
 96. Meacham, 128 S. Ct. 2395. 
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III.  RECENT SUPREME COURT CASES 
A.  Smith v. City of Jackson 
In Smith v. City of Jackson, the Supreme Court decided that the dis-
parate impact theory applies to the ADEA. The Court based the decision 
primarily on the fact that the language of the ADEA was taken word-for-
word from Title VII, which originally created the disparate impact the-
ory.97  The Court decided, however, that the plaintiff had failed to show 
the criterion causing the disparate impact.98  The Court also opined, with 
little or no analysis, that the criteria used by the City were “reasonable 
factors other than age,” which precluded liability.99 
City of Jackson involved a pay plan initiated by the City of Jackson, 
Mississippi.  The plan resulted in police officers with less than five years 
of service receiving proportionately more in raises.  Most of the officers 
in the protected class had more than five years of service.100  The Court 
decided that although disparate impact is cognizable under the ADEA, 
the plaintiffs had failed to prove their case.101 
The Court held that there were two textual differences between the 
ADEA and Title VII that indicated that liability under the disparate im-
pact theory should be narrower under the ADEA than it is under Title 
VII.  The first was that the 1991 Civil Rights Act amended Title VII to 
codify the disparate impact theory and to modify Wards Cove v. Ato-
                                           
 97. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. at 233–34.  The Court had unanimously decided that the dispa-
rate impact theory applied to Title VII, so the same language in the ADEA could not be interpreted 
to exclude the theory.  Id. at 234.  In addition, the Court noted that the defense of “reasonable factors 
other than age” provides additional support that Congress intended to proscribe employment criteria 
that had a disparate impact unless they were “reasonable.”  Id. at 239.  Finally, regulations promul-
gated by the agencies that administered the ADEA support the view that the disparate impact theory 
applies to the ADEA.  Id. at 239–40. 
 The decision is a plurality decision; however, Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment that 
disparate impact applies to the ADEA, but based his conclusion on the reasonableness of the agency 
interpretation.  Id. at 243 (Scalia, J., concurring).  In other words, five justices agreed that disparate 
impact applies to the ADEA.  The issue is no longer in doubt because the opinion in Meacham was 
joined by a majority of the Court.  See infra text accompanying note 113. 
 98. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. at 241. 
 99. Id. at 242–43. 
 100. Id. at 231.  The plan divided the five basic officer positions into steps and half-steps.  The 
wage range was based on wages paid in comparable cities in the Southeast.  Most of the officers 
were in the three lowest ranks, where there were officers both over and under age forty.  The officers 
in the two highest ranks were all over forty.  Those in the two highest ranks were given raises that 
represented a smaller percentage of their salaries, but the raises were higher in dollar amount than 
the raises given to officers in the lower ranks.  The evidence showed that the City gave raises of over 
10% to more than 66% of the officers under forty, but only 45% of the officers over forty received 
such raises.  Additionally, officers with less than five years of service received higher percentage 
raises than those with longer service.  Id. 
 101. Id. 
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nio.102  Because the 1991 amendments did not apply to the ADEA in this 
regard, Wards Cove applies to the ADEA.103  In City of Jackson, the 
plaintiffs had failed to comply with the Wards Cove requirement of iden-
tifying “the specific test, requirement or practice within the pay plan” 
that was causing the disparate impact.104 
The second textual difference—the existence of the defense of 
RFOA in the ADEA and not in Title VII—requires RFOA to be the de-
fense to a disparate impact case.105  The Court said that, unlike race and 
the other classifications protected under Title VII, age may have rele-
vance to a person’s ability to do the job.106  Thus, some criteria that ad-
versely affect older workers more than younger workers may be used if 
they are reasonable.107  In addition to determining that the plaintiffs had 
failed to identify the criterion causing the disparate impact, the Court 
said that the City of Jackson’s reason for implementing the pay plan was 
an RFOA.  The Court reasoned that the City’s explanation for the differ-
ential was the need to make the salaries of junior officers competitive in 
the market.  “Thus the disparate impact is attributable to the City’s deci-
sion to give raises based on seniority and position.  Reliance on seniority 
and rank is unquestionably reasonable given the City’s goal of raising 
employees’ salaries to match those in surrounding communities.”108  The 
Court opined that the City’s decision to give employees with less senior-
ity and lower positions a larger raise “for the  purpose of bringing sala-
ries in line with that of surrounding police forces was a decision based on 
a ‘reasonable factor other than age’ that responded to the City’s legiti-
mate goal of retaining police officers.”109 
The Court then diluted the effect of applying the disparate impact 
theory in another respect by declaring inapplicable the part of the busi-
ness necessity test that allows the plaintiff to prevail by showing that 
there are less discriminatory alternatives.  The Court said that RFOA 
does not include such an inquiry.110  “While there may have been other 
                                           
 102. Id. at 240.   See infra text accompanying notes 199–202 for an explanation of Wards Cove 
Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), which modified the business necessity defense and, 
inter alia, required the plaintiff to bear the burden of persuasion throughout the case. 
 103. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. at 241.  See infra text accompanying notes 199–202 for a fur-
ther discussion of Wards Cove. 
 104. Id. at 241. 
 105. Id. at 240. 
 106. Id. at 240–41. 
 107. Id. at 241. 
 108. Id. at 242–43. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 243. 
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reasonable ways for the City to achieve its goals, the one selected was 
not unreasonable.”111 
Justice Scalia agreed with the plurality’s rationale but would have 
used it as a basis for deferring to the reasonable views of the EEOC in 
this regard.  The concurrence noted that the regulation reflected the long-
standing position of the Department of Labor, which had originally ad-
ministered the Act, as well as the EEOC, which had taken this position in 
several proceedings.  The concurrence concluded that the EEOC’s inter-
pretation of the statute was reasonable and entitled to deference.112 
Two important issues remained after City of Jackson: who bears the 
burden of persuasion regarding RFOA, and what does RFOA mean?  
Only one of these issues has been resolved.  With regard to who bears 
the burden, the Supreme Court again decided the issue in favor of the 
plaintiff. 
B.  Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory 
Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory113  involved a reduc-
tion in force (RIF) at an atomic power laboratory in which, of the thirty-
one salaried employees affected, thirty were in the protected age 
group.114  The employees contended that the RIF had a disparate impact 
on them, in violation of the ADEA.115  The employees’ statistical expert 
showed that some of the criteria chosen to determine who would be laid 
off caused the disparate impact.  The jury found for the employees on the 
disparate impact claim.  The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the 
employees had not carried the burden of persuasion to show that the plan 
was not reasonable.116  The Supreme Court disagreed with putting the 
burden of persuasion on the plaintiffs.117 
                                           
 111. Id. 
 112. Id.  See infra text accompanying notes 150–53 for a full explanation of the regulations in 
this regard. 
 113. Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 128 S. Ct. 2395 (2008).  Justice Souter wrote the 
opinion for the majority of six, as opposed to the City of Jackson opinion in which only four mem-
bers of the Court joined.  Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 229 (2005).  Only Justice Thomas 
dissented, arguing that disparate impact does not apply at all under the ADEA.  He concurred, how-
ever, that RFOA is an affirmative defense in disparate treatment cases.  Meacham, 128 U.S. at 2407 
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment, id. 
at 2407 (Scalia, J., concurring), and Justice Breyer took no part in the case.  Id. at 2407. 
 114. Meacham, 128 S. Ct. at 2398. 
 115. Id. at 2398–99.  The employees also alleged disparate treatment, but the jury did not find 
for them on that claim, and they did not pursue it.  Id. at 2399–2400. 
 116. The procedure was more complicated than this.  In fact, in its first opinion, the court of 
appeals affirmed the jury’s verdict.  The Supreme Court vacated and remanded in light of the inter-
vening City of Jackson decision.  The court of appeals then reversed the jury verdict because it had 
been based on a showing of no business necessity, rather than a showing of no RFOA.  Id. at 2400. 
 117. Id. at 2402. 
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The Court based its decision on the text of the ADEA, pointing out 
that the ADEA’s prohibitions against discrimination are followed by ex-
emptions for employer practices that would otherwise be prohibited.118  
RFOA is one of those exemptions, as to which the employer bears the 
burden of persuasion.119  The Court applied a principle of statutory con-
struction—that those who claim an exception must prove it.  There was 
no reason to believe that Congress intended otherwise.120 
The Court also noted that in enacting the ADEA, Congress had 
drawn upon the Fair Labor Standards Act, especially the equal pay provi-
sions.121  The Court had formerly recognized the undesirability of depart-
ing from consistent interpretations of the two acts.  Thus, treating RFOA 
as an affirmative defense was further bolstered by the fact that the Equal 
Pay Act defense of “any other factor other than sex” was treated as an 
affirmative defense.122 
The employer argued that City of Jackson had applied the Wards 
Cove123 burdens of proof to the ADEA, which precluded the court from 
putting the burden of persuasion on the employer to prove RFOA as an 
affirmative defense.124  Wards Cove had put the burden of persuasion on 
the plaintiff throughout the case,125 and when the Court in City of Jack-
son said that Wards Cove applied to the ADEA, the implication was that 
the burdens of proof applied also.  In Meacham, however, the Court 
stated that the employer was over-reading City of Jackson, that the only 
part of Wards Cove that applied to the ADEA related to the plaintiff’s 
burden to prove a prima facie case of disparate impact.126  Specifically, 
the employee must identify the particular practice causing the disparate 
impact.127 
                                           
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 2401. 
 120. Id. at 2400. 
 121. Id. at 2401. 
 122. Id.  The Court also noted that its recognition of bona fide employee benefit plans as an 
affirmative defense was rejected by Congress.  Congress had legislatively overruled that case, stating 
that the action was necessary to restore its original intent to regard the defense of bona fide em-
ployee benefit plan as an affirmative defense.  Congress then changed the introductory language to 
that defense to bring it in line with the language preceding the BFOQ and RFOA defenses.  Id. at 
2401–02. 
 123. In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), the Court held that the busi-
nessjustification defense for Title VII had to be disproved by the plaintiff.  Congress later codified 
the business necessity defense as an affirmative defense to Title VII to specifically overrule this 
decision.  See infra discussion accompanying notes 203–04. 
 124. Meacham, 128 S. Ct. at 2404–05. 
 125. See infra notes 198–201 for a full discussion of Wards Cove. 
 126. Meacham, 128 S. Ct. at 2404. 
 127. It should be noted that the 1991 Civil Rights Act codified the requirement of picking out 
the specific practice for Title VII disparate impact claims.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(k) (Supp. III 1991).  
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In Meacham, the employer also argued that RFOA means any fac-
tor other than age, whether reasonable or not.  The Court rejected this 
argument as having been resolved by City of Jackson.128  When the Court 
in that case decided that classifications based on non-age factors that 
have a disparate impact on older workers may be actionable, the Court 
was implicitly rejecting the argument that RFOA means any factor other 
than age.129  However, the Court in Meacham also cited City of Jackson 
for the proposition that a reasonable factor may nevertheless lean more 
heavily on older workers.130  The Court further added that putting the 
burden of persuasion on the defendant will be important only in cases in 
which the reasonableness of the non-age factor is obscure.131  The ques-
tion for RFOA is now whether the non-age factor is reasonable. 
Despite two Supreme Court cases applying RFOA, there is no clear 
answer as to what it means.  The dictum from City of Jackson and Mea-
cham does not bode well for a restrictive meaning of RFOA, however.132  
Nevertheless, because the issue of the meaning of RFOA has not prop-
erly been before the Court, there is still hope that the Court will interpret 
RFOA as originally intended.133  Until that time, however, confusion per-
sists among lower courts when interpreting the meaning of RFOA.134 
C.  Where Has the Supreme Court Left Us with Regard to the Meaning of 
RFOA? 
As noted earlier, three Supreme Court cases developed the RFOA 
defense.  Two of these cases, Hazen Paper v. Biggins135 and City of Jack-
son, led to confusion regarding RFOA application—confusion that the 
Court has had to correct.136  In addition, both cases, along with Mea-
cham, have added to the confusion about the meaning of RFOA.  Most 
                                                                                              
Thus, there is no ostensible difference between the Wards Cove requirement that applies to the 
ADEA and the 1991 Civil Rights Act provision that applies to Title VII. 
 128. Meacham, 128 S. Ct. at 2402–03. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 2403.  It should be noted that the Court declined to grant certiorari on the meaning 
of RFOA, so this issue was never argued.  Id. at 2400 n.8. 
 131. Id. at 2406. 
 132. See supra text accompanying notes 99, 130–31. 
 133. See infra Part IV.A. 
 134. See infra Part V.B.2. 
 135. 507 U.S. 604 (1993).  For a more complete discussion of Hazen Paper, see Rehabilitate, 
supra note 18, at 1412–16. 
 136. See Meacham, 128 S. Ct. at 2400; Appellate Petition, Motion, and Filing at *10–13, Mea-
cham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 128 S. Ct. 2395 (2008) (No. 06-1505), 2007 WL 1434965. 
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importantly, the issue of the meaning of the RFOA was not presented in 
any of these cases.137 
Now, although the Court in Meacham said that the employer bears 
the burden of persuasion, it also implied that RFOA will not be difficult 
to prove and will be dispositive only when the reason is obscure.138  The 
Court also noted that the lower court did not hesitate to accept the em-
ployer’s defense and that the lower court would have to determine 
whether the outcome of the case would change by putting the burden on 
the employer.139  The Court was again foreshadowing issues not argued 
in the case.  Because of these interpretations of RFOA, lower courts have 
already begun to find employers’ justifications reasonable, even if they 
are obviously correlated—or even synonymous—with age, such as re-
tirement, seniority, higher position, and higher salary.140 
The next part will explore the possible meanings of RFOA.  The 
first possibility is that RFOA means the same as “legitimate non-
discriminatory reason,” which is any criterion that does not discriminate 
on its face.141  City of Jackson specifically precluded this interpreta-
tion;142 however, if an employer may interpose unjustified age-correlated 
factors, RFOA will mean little more than “any” factor other than age.  
The question becomes what does reasonable mean in the context of 
RFOA, especially in the context of factors that correlate with age?  There 
are four possibilities, other than legitimate non-discriminatory reason, as 
discussed below: (1)  bona fide occupational qualification, which re-
quires that the criterion be essential to the business;143 (2) business ne-
cessity, which requires that the factor be shown to predict success in the 
job;144 (3) business justification, which requires that the criterion be ra-
tionally related to the employer’s legitimate goals;145 and (4)  “any factor 
other than sex,” which is a defense to an Equal Pay Act case, but which 
often requires the employer to justify a factor that historically discrimi-
                                           
 137. See Rehabilitate, supra note 18, at 1433; see also Brief of Petitioner, supra note 95.  In 
Meacham, the Court noted: 
Petitioners also sought certiorari as to “[w]hether respondents’ practice of conferring 
broad discretionary authority upon individual managers to decide which employees to lay 
off during a reduction in force constituted a ‘reasonable factor other than age’ as a matter 
of law.” We denied certiorari on this question and express no views on it here. 
128 S. Ct. at 2400 n.8 (citation omitted). 
 138. Meacham, 128 S. Ct. at 2406–07. 
 139. Id. at 2406–07. 
 140. See infra Part V.B.2. 
 141. See infra Part IV.B.2.. 
 142. See supra text accompanying note 128. 
 143. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 144. See infra Part IV.B.4. 
 145. Id. 
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nates on the basis of sex.146  This part examines the possibilities and con-
cludes that “reasonable” must include an employer justification of any 
factor that has an obvious impact on the older workers.  Such a justifica-
tion need not be essential to the business or predict success in the job, but 
it must include proof that less discriminatory alternatives were not feasi-
ble. 
IV.  DEFINING THE MEANING OF RFOA USING A HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE OF DEFENSES TO EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS 
A.  History of RFOA 
Before the decision in Hazen Paper v. Biggins,147 the prevailing 
view was that to be a RFOA, the factor could not be correlated with 
age.148  Thus, factors that are “inherently time-based, such as experience, 
years on the job, and tenure . . . are inherently age-related and thus [could 
not] be considered ‘factors other than age.’”149  The Secretary of Labor, 
who reported on the necessity of the ADEA,150 and who administered the 
ADEA in its early days,151 issued guidelines shortly after the Act was 
                                           
 146. See infra Part IV.B.3. 
 147. 507 U.S. 604 (1993). 
 148. See infra cases cited at note 154; Player, supra note 39, at 1278. 
 149. Player, supra note 39, at 1278.  Professor Player also thought that RFOA as here defined 
should be the defense to disparate impact cases under the ADEA.  Id. at 1278–83.  See Kaminshine, 
supra note 44, at n.131 for studies correlating age, seniority and compensation. 
 150. See supra text accompanying notes 62–65. 
 151. The EEOC took over administration of the ADEA and retained the Secretary of Labor’s 
interpretation of RFOA.  Kaminshine, supra note 44, at 302–03.  See Howard Eglit, The Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act’s Forgotten Defense: The Reasonable Factors Other Than Age 
Exception, 66 B.U. L. REV. 155, 195 (1986) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 860.103(e) (1985) (rescinded)).  The 
EEOC position before and after City of Jackson is as follows: 
Differentiations based on reasonable factors other than age. 
(a) Section 4(f)(1) of the Act provides that * * * it shall not be unlawful for an 
employer, employment agency, or labor organization * * * to take any action 
otherwise prohibited under paragraphs (a), (b), (c), or (e) of this section * * * 
where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age * * *. 
(b) No precise and unequivocal determination can be made as to the scope of 
the phrase “differentiation based on reasonable factors other than age.”  
Whether such differentiations exist must be decided on the basis of all the par-
ticular facts and circumstances surrounding each individual situation. 
(c) When an employment practice uses age as a limiting criterion, the defense 
that the practice is justified by a reasonable factor other than age is unavail-
able. 
(d) When an employment practice, including a test, is claimed as a basis for 
different treatment of employees or applicants for employment on the grounds 
that it is a “factor other than” age, and such a practice has an adverse impact 
on individuals within the protected age group, it can only be justified as a 
business necessity. Tests which are asserted as “reasonable factors other than 
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passed.  These guidelines provided that to be a RFOA, a criterion must 
be “‘reasonably necessary for the specific work to be performed’ or 
‘shown to have a valid relationship to job requirements.’”152  “[T]he De-
partment of Labor’s contemporaneous understanding of the newly passed 
statute is unusually germane, given its involvement and influence in the 
legislation.”153  The lower courts generally followed the Secretary’s posi-
tion.154  In the absence of extensive legislative history on RFOA,155 these 
early interpretations are the most relevant indications of congressional 
intent.156 
Although the regulations issued by the Department of Labor made 
it clear that disparate impact applied to the ADEA,157 disparate impact 
was rarely applied in the early days of the ADEA.158  A majority of 
courts simply assumed that an employer using criteria that correlate with 
age, such as over-qualification, high salary, tenure, or seniority, was in-
tentionally discriminating and thus guilty of disparate treatment.159  
Many of these decisions were made shortly after the ADEA was enacted, 
so this was the consensus regarding the intent and meaning of the ADEA 
at that time.160  It was only after Hazen Paper—decided over twenty-five 
                                                                                              
age” will be scrutinized in accordance with the standards set forth at Part 1607 
of this Title. 
(e) When the exception of “a reasonable factor other than age” is raised 
against an individual claim of discriminatory treatment, the employer bears 
the burden of showing that the “reasonable factor other than age” exists factu-
ally. 
(f) A differentiation based on the average cost of employing older employees 
as a group is unlawful except with respect to employee benefit plans which 
qualify for the section 4(f) (2) exception to the Act. 
29 C.F.R.§ 1625.7 (1985). 
 152. 29 C.F.R.§ 1625.7 (1985). 
 153. Id.  The EEOC, which took over responsibility for the ADEA, used the term business 
necessity to describe the defense to disparate impact.  See supra note 151. 
 154. See, e.g., Taggart v. Time, Inc., 924 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1991); Abbott v. Federal Forge, Inc., 
912 F.2d 867, 875–76 (6th Cir. 1990); Jardien v. Winston Network, Inc., 888 F.2d 1151, 1157–58 
(7th Cir. 1989); White v. Westinghouse Electric Co., 862 F.2d 56, 62 (3rd Cir. 1988); Metz v. Tran-
sit Mix, Inc., 828 F.2d 1202 (7th Cir. 1987), overruled by Anderson v. Baxter HealthCare Corp., 13 
F.3d 1120 (7th Cir. 1994); Reichman v. Bonsignore, Brignati & Mazzotta P.C., 818 F.2d 278, 280–
81 (2d Cir. 1987); Dace v. ACF Indus., Inc., 722 F.2d 374, 378 (8th Cir. 1983); Leftwich v. Harris-
Stowe State College, 702 F.2d 686, 691 (8th Cir. 1983); Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 
1980).  Contra Williams v. General Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 120, 131 n.131 (5th Cir. 1981); Lauge-
son v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1975). 
 155. The legislative history of the RFOA is sparse and inconclusive.  Eglit, supra note 151, at 
180–81. 
 156. See Kaminshine, supra note 44, at 303. 
 157. See supra text accompanying notes 150–52.  The Court recognized this in Smith v. City of 
Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 236 (2005). 
 158. See Rehabilitate, supra note 18, at 1410–11. 
 159. See cases supra note 154. 
 160. See Semantic Cover, supra note 18, at 27–28. 
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years after the enactment of the ADEA—that the consensus regarding 
age-correlated factors and the applicability of the disparate impact theory 
to the ADEA began to change.161 
The courts that thought that age-correlated factors were discrimina-
tory per se were incorrect.  Congress intended for employers to retain the 
ability to justify decisions based on reasonable factors, even if such fac-
tors correlate with age.  Otherwise, employers would be forced to retain 
employees who could no longer perform.162  Hazen Paper made it clear 
that factors that correlate with age are not per se discriminatory.163  The 
lower courts over-read this decision, however, and began to hold that any 
factor that was not facially discriminatory was a defense to an ADEA 
suit.164 
Now that City of Jackson and Meacham have clarified that dispa-
rate impact does apply to the ADEA, that RFOA is the defense, and that 
the employer bears the burden of persuasion to prove it, the question of 
the meaning of RFOA remains.  Specifically, what is reasonable?  Al-
though the use of age-correlated factors should not be treated as dis-
criminatory per se, there is a large gap between holding that age-
correlated factors are discriminatory per se and holding that such factors 
                                           
 161. Id. at 30–33. The Supreme Court recognized this in City of Jackson: 
Indeed, for over two decades after our decision in Griggs, the Courts of Appeals uni-
formly interpreted the ADEA as authorizing recovery on a “disparate impact” theory in 
appropriate cases.  It was only after our decision in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 
604, 113 S. Ct. 1701, 123 L.Ed.2d 338 (1993), that some of those courts concluded that 
the ADEA did not authorize a disparate impact theory of liability. 
City of Jackson, 544 U.S. at 236–37. 
 162. See Kaminshine, supra note 44, at 289.  See Rehabilitate, supra note 18, at 1429. 
 163. 507 U.S. 604, 608 (1993). 
 164. With regard to whether the disparate impact theory applies to the ADEA, the courts held 
as follows: the First, Fifth, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits said unequivocally that the theory 
did not apply.  See Smith v. City of Jackson, 351 F.3d 183 (5th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 541 U.S. 
958 (2004); Adams v. Florida Power Corp., 255 F.3d 1322, 1325 (11th Cir. 2001), cert. granted, 534 
U.S. 1054 (2001), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 535 U.S. 228 (2002); Mullin v. Ray-
theon Co., 164 F. 3d 696, 700–01 (lst Cir. 1999); Ellis v. United Airlines, 73 F.3d 999, 1006–07 
(10th Cir. 1996); Gehring v. Case Corp., 43 F.3d 340, 342 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 The Third and the Sixth Circuits did not say that disparate impact did not apply but expressed 
serious misgivings.  See Dibiase v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719, 732–35 (3d Cir. 1995); 
Gantt v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 143 F.3d 1042, 1048 (6th Cir. 1998). 
 The Second, Eighth and Ninth Circuits continued to allow disparate impact claims.  See Criley 
v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 119 F.3d 102, 105 (2d Cir. 1997); Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 
845, 856 (9th Cir. 2000); Lewis v. Aerospace Cmty. Credit Union, 114 F.3d 745, 750 (8th Cir. 
1997).  The Eighth Circuit had indicated some doubt as to whether disparate impact applies, how-
ever.  See Allen v. Entergy, 193 F.3d 1010, 1015 n.5 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 The Fourth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit had not addressed this issue.  See Adams, 255 F.3d at 
1325 n.5.  In a case on an unrelated issue, however, the D.C. Circuit interpreted Hazen Paper to 
caste doubt on the applicability of the disparate impact theory to the ADEA.  Contractors’ Labor 
Pool, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 323 F.3d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 2003).  See Rehabilitate, supra note 18, at 1418–22 
for a complete discussion of the rationales used by the various courts. 
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are reasonable and thus a defense to an ADEA claim.  The middle 
ground is that the employer should have to justify the use of factors that 
obviously correlate with age.  Thus, the employer should not simply in-
terpose a factor that correlates with age and denominate it as reasonable 
without some justification.  The challenge for this article is to determine 
what kind of justification the employer should have to make.  To put this 
query into perspective, it will be helpful to explore the hierarchy of de-
fenses to discrimination cases to see where RFOA belongs.  The hierar-
chy of defenses about to be described starts with the most difficult de-
fense to prove, bona fide occupational qualification, and continues to the 
least difficult to prove, legitimate non-discriminatory reason.  The gap in 
between is where RFOA should fit. 
B.  Other Defenses 
Any discussion of the meaning of defenses to discrimination cases 
has to begin with Title VII, the patriarch of the anti-discrimination stat-
utes.165  Because Title VII did not define discrimination, this task was left 
to the courts.166  As noted above,167 the Supreme Court identified two 
theories of discrimination under Title VII: disparate impact and disparate 
treatment.168  Because of the similarity between Title VII and the ADEA, 
the Court then applied both theories to the ADEA.169  These theories 
have resulted in five defenses: bona fide occupational qualification, le-
gitimate non-discriminatory reason, “any other factor other than sex” 
under the Equal Pay Act, business necessity, and business justification. 
1.  Statutory Defense of Bona Fide Occupational Qualification 
Bona fide occupational qualification is the only general statutory 
defense for a Title VII disparate treatment case, and it is also a statutory 
                                           
 165. Title VII, one of the comprehensive anti-discrimination acts, was enacted in 1964.  Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., (1989 & Supp. 1995).  The ADEA was enacted in 
1967.  Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90–202, 8 Stat. 602 (codified as 
amended in scattered Sections of 29 U.S.C.).  The Americans with Disabilities Act was not enacted 
until 1991.  42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2000). 
 166. See JOEL W. FRIEDMAN & GEORGE M. STRICKLER, THE LAW OF EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION 246 (Foundation Press 2000). 
 167. See supra text accompanying notes 77–79. 
 168. See Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).  See also McDonnell Douglas Corp. 
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (in which the Court constructed the burden and order of proof in an 
intentional discrimination case). 
 169. See Rehabilitate, supra note 18, at 1409–10.  After Hazen Paper, the courts ceased to 
apply the disparate impact theory to the ADEA.  City of Jackson then clarified that the theory does 
apply to the ADEA.  See supra Part III.A. 
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defense to an ADEA disparate treatment case.170  Whenever the em-
ployer makes employment decisions based on a factor that on its face 
names a protected class, or a part thereof, such as a policy that denies 
employment to women or to persons over forty, the employer is required 
to defend the policy using the bona fide occupational qualification 
(BFOQ) defense.  BFOQ requires the employer to prove that the policy 
is essential to the business.171  The defense is strictly construed and is 
difficult to prove under both Title VII and the ADEA.172 
BFOQ is available as a defense only when the employer has a fa-
cially discriminatory policy; consequently, there is a gap in Title VII’s 
statutory scheme in the more common circumstance that does not involve 
facial discrimination.  Because there are no other general defenses to dis-
crimination under Title VII, the courts were called upon not only to de-
fine discrimination but to create defenses to both disparate impact and 
disparate treatment discrimination. 
2.  Legitimate Non-Discriminatory Reason 
For disparate treatment cases, the Court created the defense of “le-
gitimate non-discriminatory reason.”173  Commentators and courts as-
sumed for many years that “legitimate” meant “proper,” so that a legiti-
mate non-discriminatory reason could not be just any reason that did not 
discriminate on its face.174 
However, in Hazen Paper v. Biggins,175 the Court held that dis-
criminating based on pension benefits is not per se discriminatory under 
the ADEA because the defense to disparate treatment cases is any reason 
that does not discriminate on its face.176  The Court said that although 
language in prior decisions could be interpreted to mean that the legiti-
mate non-discriminatory reason excludes any employer justification that 
is improper, this interpretation is not correct.  “For example, it cannot be 
                                           
 170. Title VII and the ADEA also have in common the bona fide seniority system defense, but 
it is not helpful to this discussion.  See Semantic Cover, supra note 18, at 9. 
 171. See id. at 34. 
 172. See Rehabilitate, supra note 18, at 1423. 
 173. McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792.  The Court has decided cases under the 
ADEA interpreting legitimate non-discriminatory reason, but it has continued to “assume without 
deciding” that legitimate non-discriminatory reason applies to the ADEA.  See O’Connor v. Con-
solidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 311 (1996); St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 
U.S. 502, 506 n.1 (1993); but see Hazen Paper v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 612 (1993). 
 174. See Player, supra note 75, at 334. “The term ‘legitimate’ presupposes that the articulated 
reason is lawful.  If an employee establishes a prima facie case of sex discrimination, an employer 
does not articulate a reason that is ‘legitimate’ by presenting evidence that the employee was ille-
gally discriminated against her because of her race, age or union membership.”  Id. 
 175. Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. 604. 
 176. Id. at 611. 
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true that an employer who fires an older black worker because the work-
er is black thereby violates the ADEA. The employee’s race is an im-
proper reason, but it is improper under Title VII, not the ADEA.”177 
Interpreting legitimate non-discriminatory reason to be “any rea-
son,” regardless of how improper it is, reads out the “legitimate” part of 
“legitimate non-discriminatory reason.”  This interpretation means that 
any factor that does not facially discriminate can be a legitimate non-
discriminatory reason.  However, the Court has now recognized in City 
of Jackson that RFOA does not mean the same thing as legitimate non-
discriminatory reason.178  Applying RFOA, the Court said that the em-
ployer’s justification has to be reasonable.179  Beyond the fact that rea-
sonable must be more than any reason that is not facially discriminatory, 
the quest for this article is to define what “reasonable” means. 
3.  “Any Other Factor Other Than Sex” Under the Equal Pay Act 
Because Congress was not legislating in a vacuum when it adopted 
RFOA, there are other sources for the meaning of what is reasonable for 
RFOA purposes.  In Meacham, the Court noted that in enacting the 
ADEA, Congress had drawn on the equal pay provisions of the Fair La-
bor Standards Act.180  The Court recognized that the defense of RFOA 
was obviously modeled on the Equal Pay Act’s defense of “any other 
factor other than sex” (FOTS).  Thus, the Court’s decision to treat RFOA 
as an affirmative defense was bolstered by the fact that FOTS was al-
ready treated as an affirmative defense.181  The Court in City of Jackson 
also referenced the FOTS defense to support its determination that 
RFOA did not mean just any neutral factor, that is, any factor that is not 
facially discriminatory.182 
                                           
 177. Id. at 612. 
 178. See generally Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 238–39 (2005).  The Court said in 
City of Jackson that RFOA does not mean any factor other than age.  Id.  Similarly, the Court in 
Hazen Paper stated that legitimate non-discriminatory reason does mean any factor other than age.  
507 U.S. at 612. 
 179. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. at 238–39. 
 180. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d); Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 128 S. Ct. 2395, 2406 
(2008). 
 181. Meacham, 128 S. Ct. at 2401. 
 182. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. at 238–39.  If RFOA had meant any neutral factor, disparate 
impact would not apply under the ADEA, as the Court said was the case under the Equal Pay Act 
because of FOTS.  Id. at 239 n.11. 
 The connection between the Equal Pay Act and the ADEA is not limited to the defenses.  The 
remedial provisions of the ADEA were also drawn from the Fair Labor Standards Act.  See Judith J. 
Johnson, A Standard for Punitive Damages Under Title VII, 46 FLA. L. REV. 521, 551 (1995) [here-
inafter Standard]. 
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The Equal Pay Act requires that the employer not discriminate on 
the basis of sex for employees performing equal work.183  At first blush, 
a defense to the Equal Pay Act does not seem relevant to an ADEA dis-
cussion.  However, because of the Court’s recognition of the connection 
between FOTS and RFOA, the meaning of FOTS may be important in 
determining what is reasonable under the RFOA defense. 
In the first and only case in which the Supreme Court squarely con-
fronted the meaning of FOTS, Corning Glass Works v. Brennan,184 the 
Court indicated that “any other factor other than sex” should not include 
factors that perpetuate the effects of past discrimination.185  Although the 
courts have not been in agreement on what FOTS means after Corning 
Glass,186 a similar argument can be made that unjustified criteria that 
historically impact older workers should not be considered RFOA’s un-
der the ADEA. 
Despite the Equal Pay Act’s language that “any other factor other 
than sex” is a defense, many courts require some business justification 
for the use of a factor that has historically had an adverse impact on 
women.187  Even under the Equal Pay Act, therefore, a factor that corre-
lates with sex is not necessarily considered just “any” factor other than 
sex and may not be a sufficient defense.188 
                                           
 183. See Friedman, supra note 166, at 779. 
 184. 417 U.S. 188 (1974).  The Supreme Court held that the employer violated the Equal Pay 
Act by paying male night inspection workers at a higher base wage than female day inspection em-
ployees.  The employer did not cure its violation by permitting women to work as night shift inspec-
tors or by equalizing rates on the two shifts, but retaining “red circle” rate that perpetuated the dis-
crimination.  Id. at 209.  In City of Jackson, the Supreme Court stated in dicta: 
[I]f Congress intended to prohibit all disparate impact claims, it certainly could have done 
so. For instance, in the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1), Congress barred 
recovery if a pay differential was based “on any other factor”—reasonable or unreason-
able—“other than sex.” The fact that Congress provided that employers could use only 
reasonable factors in defending a suit under the ADEA is therefore instructive. 
544 U.S. at 239 n.11 (emphasis added). 
 185. 417 U.S. at 209.  The Court concluded that “the company’s continued discrimination in 
base wages between night and day workers, though phrased in terms of a neutral factor other than 
sex, nevertheless operated to perpetuate the effects of the company’s prior illegal practice of paying 
women less than men for equal work.”  Id. 
 186. The Court denied certiorari in 1992, refusing to resolve the conflict in the circuits.  Al-
drich v. Randolph Central Sch. Dst. 963 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 965 (1992) 
(White, J., dissenting).  In a dissent to the denial of certiorari, Justice White, with two other justices 
agreeing, outlined the conflict in the circuits.  Id. 
 187. See, e.g., Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 188. See Player, supra note 75, at 419.  “If the factor has a bona fide relationship to employer 
concerns, is not premised on gender considerations, and is uniformly applied, it will be a ‘factor 
other than sex.’”  Id. 
 An illustration of how courts have interpreted FOTS is in the treatment of whether the use of 
previous salary to determine present salary is an FOTS because past salary tends to perpetuate his-
torical discrimination against women.  In Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., the court concluded that the 
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Although the Court has recognized that FOTS was the model for 
the RFOA defense, it noted that the addition of the word “reasonable” to 
RFOA indicates a congressional concern that RFOA be more limited 
than FOTS.189  Thus, with many courts elevating the proof required for 
FOTS to require a business justification for criteria that have historically 
discriminated against women, the case for requiring an age-correlated 
factor to be more justified is even stronger. 
After Hazen Paper, a legitimate non-discriminatory reason does not 
have to be rationally related to the employer’s goals; however, FOTS 
may fill this gap.  In addition, the Court created another defense that does 
require a rational relationship to the employer’s goals, the defense of 
“business justification,” as a defense to disparate impact.  Because busi-
ness justification is an interpretation of the business necessity defense, 
that defense must also be examined. 
4.  Business Justification and Business Necessity in Title VII Cases 
Title VII prohibits not only intentional discrimination, but also dis-
crimination that has a disproportionate impact on the protected class.190  
Disparate impact is generally associated with unintentional discrimina-
tion, in which the employer is using a neutral factor that has an incidental 
impact on the protected class.  However, disparate impact can also detect 
intentional discrimination that is difficult to prove.191  In Griggs v. Duke 
Power Co., the Court said that if the employer uses an employment crite-
                                                                                              
employer cannot use such a factor “which causes a wage differential between male and female em-
ployees absent an acceptable business reason.”  691 F.2d at 876.  In Glenn v. General Motors Corp., 
841 F.2d 1567, 1570 (11th Cir. 1988), the Eleventh Circuit went further and said that relying on past 
salary was per se not an FOTS, except in limited circumstances.  The court cited Corning Glass 
Works v. Brennen, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1988), in which the Court rejected the market force theory 
that allowed women to be paid less because this was the evil the Act was designed to eliminate.  
Similarly, in Taylor v. White, 321 F.3d 710, 719 (8th Cir. 2002), the court rejected the “reasonable-
ness” requirement, but said that the record must be carefully reviewed “for evidence that contradicts 
an employer’s claim of gender-neutrality.”   
 Obviously, if a factor that correlates with sex must be justified in some way to be “any other 
factor other than sex,” it is even more evident that “reasonable factors other than age” must be justi-
fied. 
 189. Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 128 S. Ct. 2395, 2401 (2008). 
 190. See supra text accompanying notes 74–81. 
 191. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with 
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).  Professor Lawrence argued that proof of dis-
criminatory intent does not cure the problem of workplace discrimination, which is a by-product of 
societal discrimination, largely brought about by unconscious discrimination.  See also David B. 
Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899 (1993).  Professor Oppenheimer 
suggests that since most discrimination is unintentional, a better theory of discrimination would be 
based on negligence, rather than intent.  Disparate impact theory would more effectively eradicate 
societal discrimination, including age discrimination.  See Semantic Cover, supra note 18, at 58 
n.251 for further discussion of this issue. 
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rion that has a disparate impact on a protected class under Title VII, the 
employer must justify it as a business necessity.192  Before Congress en-
acted the 1991 Civil Rights Act, the Court had not provided an exact 
meaning of business necessity.193  Generally, business necessity required 
the employer to prove that the criterion having the disparate impact pre-
dicted success in the job.194 
To prove business necessity, the EEOC Selection Guidelines re-
quire the employer to validate employment criteria by one of three psy-
chological methods195—an expensive and difficult process.196  The Court 
has cited the guidelines with approval, emphasizing that criteria must be 
“predictive of or significantly correlated with important elements of 
work behavior which comprise or are relevant to the job or jobs for 
which candidates are being evaluated.”197 
Until 1989, the lower courts agreed that employment criteria having 
a disparate impact had to be justified by business necessity, and that 
meant the criterion predicted success in the job.198  In 1989, the Court 
decided in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio199 that the plaintiff bore 
                                           
 192. 410 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).  “The touchstone is business necessity.  If an employment 
practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the 
practice is prohibited.”  Id. 
 193. See Mack A. Player, Is Griggs Dead? Reflecting (Fearfully) on Wards Cove Packing Co. 
v. Atonio, 17 FLA. U.L. REV. 1, 2 (1989). 
 194. See BARBARA LINDEMANN SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
LAW 112–14 (2d ed. 1983). 
 195. EEOC Selection Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(A) (1994). 
Evidence of the validity of a test or other selection procedure by a criterion-related valid-
ity study should consist of empirical data demonstrating that the selection procedure is 
predictive of or significantly correlated with important elements of job performance. . . .  
Evidence of the validity of a test or other selection procedure by a content validity study 
should consist of data showing that the content of the selection procedure is representa-
tive of important aspects of performance on the job for which the candidates are to be 
evaluated. . . .  Evidence of validity of a test or other selection procedure through a con-
struct validity study should consist of data showing that the procedure measures the de-
gree to which candidates have identifiable characteristics which have been determined to 
be important in successful performance in the job for which the candidates are to be eva-
luated. 
Id. at § 1607.5(B). 
 196. See SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 194, at 68–73. 
 197. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 433 U.S. 321, 331 n.14 (1975). 
 198. See Friedman, supra note 166, at 252. 
 199. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).  Until that point, the courts universally held that once the plaintiff 
demonstrated a prima facie case by showing that an employment practice had an adverse impact, the 
employer had to bear the burden of proof and persuasion to show that the practice was justified by 
business necessity.  Id.; see also Howard Eglit, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title 
VII, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991: Three Acts and a Dog That Didn’t Bark, 39 WAYNE L. REV. 
1093, 1129–30 (1993).  Professor Player  succinctly explained the effect Wards Cove had on the 
burden of proof: 
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the burden of persuasion throughout the case and that the employer’s 
burden of proving its defense was not as onerous as previously 
thought.200  According to Wards Cove, when justifying its actions, the 
employer must show that “the challenged practice serves, in a significant 
way, the legitimate employment goals of the employer,” but it is not nec-
essary that the practice be “essential” or “indispensable” to the busi-
ness.201   At this point, as with all disparate impact cases, if the employer 
met its burden of proof, the employee could still win by showing an al-
ternative selection criterion that had less of a disparate impact.202 
Shortly after Wards Cove, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 
1991, which was principally directed at correcting Wards Cove’s inter-
pretation of the protections offered by Title VII.203  Among other things, 
the Act codified the disparate impact test and clarified the burden of 
proof by providing that, once the plaintiff has shown disparate impact, 
the employer must bear the burden of proof and persuasion to demon-
strate that the practice is “job related to the position in question and con-
sistent with business necessity.”204 
In City of Jackson, the Supreme Court ruled that because the provi-
sions of the 1991 Civil Rights Act that overruled Wards Cove for Title 
VII did not specifically include the ADEA, Wards Cove continued to 
                                                                                              
Wards Cove Packing procedurally rewrote the assumption that the burden was on the 
employer to prove the business necessity of the device proven to have an adverse impact.  
It held that the employer’s burden was no more than that of presenting evidence that the 
challenged device significantly served a legitimate employer interest.  The ultimate bur-
den was on the plaintiff to prove that the challenged device did not serve the employer’s 
business interests.  Wards Cove Packing was also seen by some as substantively diluting 
the content of “business necessity.”  Although the Court emphasized that the employer’s 
reasons must be business related and that these ends must be significantly served, the 
Court moved away from any suggestion of “necessity” and utilized language that sug-
gested mere “legitimacy” would suffice to justify adverse impact. 
Player, supra note 22, at 836. 
 200. See Friedman, supra note 166, at 252. 
 201. 490 U.S. at 659 (citations omitted).   
 202. Wards Cove added another obstacle to the plaintiff’s case.  He would win at this stage 
only if the employer refused the suggested alternative.  490 U.S. at 661. 
 203. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102–166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). 
§ 2. Findings 
The Congress finds that— 
(1) additional remedies under Federal Law are needed to deter unlawful har-
assment and intentional discrimination in the workplace; 
(2) the decision of the Supreme Court in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 
490 U.S. 642 (1989) has weakened the scope and effectiveness of Federal civ-
il rights protections; and 
(3) legislation is necessary to provide additional protections against unlawful 
discrimination in employment. 
 204. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (Supp. III 1991).  The Act defines the term “demonstrate”: “The 
term ‘demonstrate’ means meets the burden of production and persuasion.” Id. § 2000e. 
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apply to the ADEA.205  The applicable defense, however, is RFOA in-
stead of business necessity.206  Additionally, as opposed to Wards Cove, 
in an ADEA case the plaintiff does not have an opportunity to show a 
less discriminatory alternative to counter the defense.207  Subsequently, 
in Meacham, the Court clarified that the Wards Cove requirement that 
the burden of persuasion rests on the plaintiff at all times did not apply to 
the ADEA because RFOA is an affirmative defense, as to which the em-
ployer bears the burden of persuasion.208 
Before City of Jackson, there was a good argument that RFOA 
should be equated with business necessity, and it is true that the EEOC 
and the Department of Labor regulations indicated that RFOA should 
predict success in the job, which was the generally accepted meaning of 
business necessity.  City of Jackson precluded that argument.209  Yet it 
can still be argued that RFOA should be equated with Wards Cove’s 
business justification defense.  The next part explores these arguments. 
V.  WHERE DOES RFOA FIT IN THE HIERARCHY OF EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION DEFENSES? 
A.  Generally 
Where does RFOA belong in this hierarchy of defenses to various 
employment discrimination claims?  Obviously RFOA has to fit some-
where between BFOQ, which is the most difficult defense to prove, and 
legitimate non-discriminatory reason, which is the easiest defense to 
prove.  It is not necessary for RFOA to be as strict as BFOQ.  In fact, this 
would conflict with the statutory scheme that distinguishes between the 
two defenses.210  Similarly, business necessity, which requires validation 
to show that a criterion predicts success in the job,211 would also seem to 
be a stricter standard than Congress intended.  In any event, City of Jack-
son said that the defense is not business necessity.212  “Any other factor 
other than sex” sheds some light on the best solution, which is that the 
employer should have to justify using criteria that correlate with age.213  
For criteria not correlated with age, business justification provides guid-
                                           
 205. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 239 (2005). 
 206. Id. at 238–39. 
 207. Id. at 243. 
 208. Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 128 S. Ct. 2395, 2402 (2008). 
 209. See supra text accompanying notes 151–53 for a full explanation of the EEOC regulations 
in this regard. 
 210. See supra note 71. 
 211. See supra Part IV.B.4.   
 212. See supra note 105. 
 213. See supra Part IV.B.3. 
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ance for justifying such factors as furthering the employer’s legitimate 
goals.214  One point is clear: RFOA should not be as lax as legitimate 
non-discriminatory reason because this would allow any employer con-
duct that it not facially discriminatory.215  Unfortunately, despite the fact 
that City of Jackson said that RFOA must be reasonable216 and is thus not 
the same as legitimate non-discriminatory reason,217 courts are still 
equating the two.218 
B.  Judicial Interpretations of RFOA 
1.  Supreme Court 
In both Meacham and City of Jackson, the Court overextended it-
self and made pronouncements that affected the meaning of RFOA.219  
The Court in both cases said that RFOA could disproportionately affect 
the protected class, and even then, the defense would not be difficult to 
prove.220  However, the issue of RFOA was neither briefed nor argued in 
either case.221 
In City of Jackson, the Court held that the plaintiffs had not identi-
fied the part of the plan that was causing the disparate impact, so they did 
not prove a prima facie case.222  Nevertheless, the Court reached out and 
decided that, even if the plaintiffs had proven a prima facie case, RFOA 
should be the defense, and, without further analysis, it determined that 
the City of Jackson’s plan was reasonable.223  The Court said that the 
City of Jackson had used the factors of seniority and position, which 
would always be reasonable.224  This may be true if seniority is used to 
grant a benefit to those with greater seniority, but surely not if it is used 
to impose a detriment.  The city used greater seniority and higher posi-
                                           
 214. See supra Part IV.B.4. 
 215. See supra Part IV.B.2. 
 216. 544 U.S. at 538–39. 
 217. See supra Part IV.B.2 and text accompanying note 178. 
 218. See, e.g., Whittington v. Nordam Group, Inc., 429 F.3d 986, 997 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing 
jury instructions that included the following: “If, however, Plaintiff persuades you . . . then you must 
consider Defendant’s defense that its actions regarding Plaintiff’s employment were based upon a 
reasonable factor other than age discrimination. . . .  [R]emember that Defendant must only articulate 
a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions.”); Armstrong v. Jackson, No. 05-0075, 2006 
WL 2024975, at *6 (D.D.C. July 17, 2006); Reese v. Potter, No. 03-1987, 2005 WL 3274052, at *5 
(D.D.C. Sept. 28, 2005); Embrico v. U.S. Steel Corp., 404 F. Supp. 2d 802, 829 (E.D. Penn. 2005).  
In all of these cases, the courts equated RFOA with legitimate non-discriminatory reason. 
 219. See supra text accompanying notes 99, 130–31. 
 220. Id. 
 221. See supra notes 95, 130, 137, and text accompanying notes. 
 222. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 241 (2005). 
 223. Id. at 239. 
 224. Id. at 242–43. 
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tion to the detriment of those employees with more seniority and higher 
positions.225  Greater seniority and higher position correlate strongly with 
age and should never be reasonable unless justified.226 
The Court also said that the city’s desire to attract and retain offi-
cers was a legitimate goal,227 which is certainly true; however, at this 
point, the Court was confusing the goal with the method of achieving it.  
The Court provided no explanation for why the city’s decision to use 
greater seniority and higher position as criteria to confer a detriment was 
reasonable.228  Part of the employer’s burden to show reasonableness 
should be to show why it was necessary to use an age-correlated factor to 
detrimentally affect the protected class. 
In Meacham, the Court did not accept certiorari on the issue of 
“[w]hether respondents’ practice of conferring broad discretionary au-
thority upon individual managers to decide which employees to lay off 
during a reduction in force constituted a ‘reasonable factor other than 
age’ as a matter of law.”229  Nevertheless, despite the fact that the Court 
said it was expressing no views on the issue, it gratuitously noted that 
putting the burden of proving RFOA on the defendant will matter only in 
the cases “where the reasonableness of the non-age factor is obscure for 
some reason . . . .”230 
Thus, Meacham and City of Jackson both said that RFOA could 
disadvantage the protected class and made pronouncements that affect 
                                           
 225. Id. 
 226. See supra Part IV.A. 
 227. 544 U.S. at 242–43. 
 228. This is contrary to the Court’s view in other cases, in which it has protected seniority to 
the detriment of other federal rights.  In US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002), the Court 
held that accommodating the plaintiff’s disability by overriding the seniority system was not a rea-
sonable accommodation in the usual case under the Americans with Disabilities Act.  “[W]hether 
collectively bargained or unilaterally imposed by the employer, seniority systems provide ‘important 
employee benefits by creating, and fulfilling, employee expectations of fair, uniform treatment.’”  Id. 
at 404–05.  “The lower courts have unanimously found that collectively bargained seniority trumps 
the need for reasonable accommodation.”  Id. at 403.  Similarly, in TWA v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 
(1977), the Court said that “[c]ollective bargaining aimed at effecting workable and enforceable 
agreements between management and labor, lies at the core of our national labor policy, and senior-
ity provisions are universally included in these contracts.”  Id. at 84.  Furthermore, in Int’l Bhd. of 
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), the Court upheld the exemption to Title VII for 
bona fide seniority systems: 
[A]lthough a seniority system inevitably tends to perpetuate the effects of pre-Act dis-
crimination in such cases, the congressional judgment was that Title VII should not out-
law the use of existing seniority lists and thereby destroy or water down the vested sen-
iority rights of employees simply because their employer had engaged in discrimination 
prior to the passage of the Act. 
Id. at 352–53. 
 229. Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 128 S. Ct. 2395, 2400 n.8 (2008). 
 230. Id. at 2406. 
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the meaning of RFOA.231  In City of Jackson, the Court said that the plan 
was reasonable with little analysis,232 and in Meacham, the Court com-
mented on when RFOA would make a difference, also without analy-
sis.233  Again, in neither case had the issue of RFOA been briefed or ar-
gued.234  The lower courts have taken these hints and found proof of 
RFOA to be anything but onerous. 
2.  Lower Courts After City of Jackson 
Following the decision in City of Jackson, lower courts continue to 
confuse legitimate non-discriminatory reasons with RFOA’s reasonable-
ness standard by ignoring alternative measures that contribute to the 
overall reasonableness of the action in question.  The fact that both Mea-
cham and City of Jackson said that the plaintiff may no longer show less 
discriminatory alternatives has added to the lower courts’ failure to scru-
tinize justifications interposed by employers as reasonable.  The lower 
court’s opinion in the Meacham case is instructive as to this trend.235 
There were two circuit court opinions appealed to the Supreme 
Court in Meacham.236  In the first opinion, the lower court applied the 
Wards Cove order of proof.237  To reiterate, Wards Cove requires the 
plaintiff to prove a prima facie case, to which the employer must respond 
with a business justification; the plaintiff can win only by showing a less 
discriminatory alternative.238  In the original Meacham opinion, the court 
decided that the plaintiffs had proven a prima facie case by showing that 
the employer’s subjective assessments of “criticality” and “flexibility” 
caused a disparate impact,239 but that the employer articulated a business 
justification of workforce reduction.  The plaintiffs prevailed only be-
cause they were allowed to present proof of a less discriminatory alterna-
tive—that the same result could have been achieved with more objective 
evaluations.240 
The defendants then appealed, and the Court remanded for recon-
sideration in light of City of Jackson.241  The court of appeals remanded 
                                           
 231. Id. at 2403, 2406; City of Jackson, 544 U.S. at 241. 
 232. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. at 242–43. 
 233. Meacham, 128 S. Ct. at 2406–07. 
 234. See supra notes 95, 130, 137. 
 235. Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 461 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2006) (on remand from the 
Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of Smith v. City of Jackson) [hereinafter Meacham II]. 
 236. Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 381 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2004) [hereinafter Mea-
cham I]; Meacham II, 461 F.3d. 
 237. Meacham I, 381 F.3d at 74. 
 238. See supra text accompanying notes 199–202. 
 239. Meacham I, 381 F.3d at 74. 
 240. Meacham I, 381 F.3d at 74–75. 
 241. Meacham II, 461 F.3d at 137. 
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the case to the district court with instructions to enter judgment as a mat-
ter of law for the defendant.242  On remand, the lower court held that be-
cause City of Jackson said that the order of proof ended with the defen-
dant’s articulation, the RIF plan was reasonable.  In other words, the 
plaintiffs lost on remand because they were no longer allowed to show a 
less discriminatory alternative.243  The defendant’s facially legitimate 
business justification for reducing its workforce, while at the same time 
retaining employees who had skills that were critical to the operation, 
was sufficient to absolve it of liability. The fact that the decisions were 
made almost totally subjectively using age-correlated factors did not fig-
ure into the court’s determination that the justification was reasonable.244 
Although the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the decision 
because the court of appeals had put the burden of persuasion on the 
plaintiffs, the Court did agree that the plaintiffs could no longer show 
less discriminatory alternatives.245  The Court also opined that putting the 
burden of persuasion on the defendant might not make any difference in 
the lower court’s decision.246 
It surely cannot be the case that a plaintiff could win under the less 
strenuous standard of proof in Wards Cove,247 under which the defendant 
has no burden of persuasion, and yet lose when the burden of persuasion 
is placed on the defendant to show that its plan was reasonable.  In situa-
tions where the impact of using age-related factors will predictably fall 
on older employees, the employer is at least reckless with regard to 
whether he is discriminating against the protected class.  In such situa-
tions, part of the showing of reasonableness must be the lack of suitable 
alternatives. 
Instead of showing reasonableness by way of a lack of suitable al-
ternatives, however, the lower courts are deciding that age-correlated 
factors standing alone are reasonable factors other than age.  By deciding 
cases in this way, the courts are creating case law that is counter to the 
protections afforded by the ADEA. 
For example, in Townsend v. Weyerhaeuser Co., the court opined 
that “[c]ertainly, an employer that decides to terminate an employee to 
                                           
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. 
 244. See id. 
 245. Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 128 S. Ct. 2395, 2405 n.14 (2008). 
 246. Id. at 2406.  The court of appeals remanded the case to the district court, Meacham v. 
Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, 302 Fed. Appx. 748 (2d. Cir. 2009), and the district court held 
that the defendants had waived the defense of RFOA and reinstated the judgment for the plaintiffs.  
Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, No. 97-CV-12, 2009 WL 1212797 (N.D.N.Y. May 1, 
2009). 
 247. See supra text accompanying notes 199–202. 
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relieve itself of the burden of that employee’s high salary or health care 
costs has based its decision on ‘reasonable factors’ other than the em-
ployee’s age.”248  This is exactly what the ADEA was enacted to pre-
vent—discrimination based on factors so closely correlated with age that 
the factors disguise actual age discrimination.249 
Similarly, in Silver v. Leavitt,250 the court said that the defendant 
had valid concerns regarding its strained budget, the cost of salaries and 
benefits, attracting new workers, and losing a large number of employ-
ees.  The court said that it was reasonable for the defendant to recruit 
candidates at the lowest level possible in order to accomplish its goals. 
“By recruiting workers who cost less to employ and are less likely to re-
tire in the near future, defendant was arguably making the most of the 
money spent on the selection, hiring, and training of employees.”251  This 
is an obvious example of court-approved age discrimination, and a deci-
sion of this sort directly contravenes the intent of the ADEA. 
Even more explicitly contradicting the purpose of the ADEA, the 
court in Rollins v. Clear Creek Independent School District flatly said 
that retirement status was a reasonable factor other than age.252  In Al-
dridge v. City of Memphis, another case producing an astounding inter-
pretation of disparate impact under the ADEA, the city eliminated the 
position of captain of the police force to cut costs.253  The court said that 
because promotion to captain was automatic after thirty years of service, 
this assured that all captains were in the protected age group.  The court 
therefore reasoned that because this statistical disparity was expected, 
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 250. Silver v. Leavitt, No. 05-0968, 2006 WL 626928, at *14 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2006). 
 251. Id. (emphasis added).  In Turner v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., No. 05-5061, 2005 WL 
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 253. Aldridge v. City of Memphis, No. 05-2966, 2008 WL 2999557 (W.D. Tenn. July 31, 
2008). 
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there could be no inference of discrimination.254  In other words, the me-
thod of saving money caused a completely predictable 100% impact on 
the protected class but was not considered sufficient evidence of dispa-
rate impact.255 
What is this but allowing blatant age discrimination to be an 
RFOA?256  Allocating the burden of persuasion is irrelevant if courts are 
going to allow retirement, seniority, and higher healthcare costs to be 
RFOAs.257  So far, the courts (and the Court) have not distinguished be-
tween those factors that correlate obviously with age and those that are 
just incidentally shown to have a disparate impact on older employees.  
The latter should be easier to justify; the former should be more difficult.  
The most important point here is that if the employer chooses a factor 
that obviously correlates with age, RFOA should require proof of justifi-
cation.  It should be clear that if the employer is reckless about using a 
factor that screens out older employees, he is very close to intentionally 
discriminating, and such a factor should not be an RFOA without further 
justification. 
VI.  PROPOSED SOLUTION TO THE MEANING OF RFOA 
RFOA should not require validation in the usual case, as would 
business necessity.  However, when the criterion has a predictably dispa-
rate impact on the protected class, the employer should have to show 
more than that the criterion served his legitimate goal.  If the employer is 
acting with a sufficiently culpable state of mind with regard to whether 
the criterion treats the protected class less favorably, he should not be 
able to interpose the criterion itself as a reasonable method of achieving 
                                           
 254. Id. at *7. 
 255. The court also accepted the defendant’s reason that it “had no need for a management 
level rank achieved solely by length of service,” that it “was not operationally necessary,” and that it 
resulted in a substantial savings.  Id. at *8.  Quoting City of Jackson v. Smith, the court noted that 
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 257. High position also generally correlates with age.  See, e.g., Aldridge, 2008 WL 2999557. 
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his goals without further justification.  In this way, the purpose of the 
ADEA will be fulfilled because improper factors will not be used to sub-
stantiate the RFOA defense. 
City of Jackson is a perfect illustration.  To justify its pay plan, the 
city articulated the legitimate goal of recruiting and retaining police offi-
cers.258  What the Court failed to appreciate was that to achieve that goal, 
the city was using the obviously age-correlated factors of greater senior-
ity and higher position.259  In this situation, the city was at least reckless 
with regard to whether the criteria would screen out older employees. 
In such a case of reckless disregard, the employer should have to 
justify the criteria used to achieve the goal, not just the goal itself.  In 
other words, any employer using criteria that obviously correlate with 
age should be considered reckless with regard to whether he is discrimi-
nating based on age, in which case he should have a heavier burden to 
prove RFOA.  The employer should have to prove not only that the goal 
was legitimate, but also that a less discriminatory alternative was not fea-
sible. 
Surely an employer acting recklessly with regard to whether he is 
discriminating could not also be declared reasonable without more, as the 
Court did in City of Jackson.260  Under the ADEA, if the employer is 
reckless with regard to whether he is violating the Act, he is guilty of a 
willful violation and must pay liquidated damages.261  It is counterintui-
tive that an employer who would otherwise be guilty of a willful viola-
tion would be exonerated of liability because the criterion he recklessly 
used was an RFOA.262 
There may be other situations in which the employer may have 
acted recklessly without using obviously age-correlated factors.  For ex-
ample, in Meacham, the employer also had a legitimate goal of cutting 
                                           
 258. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 242–43 (2005). 
 259. Id. 
 260. Recklessness is already an important consideration in ADEA cases.  If the employer is 
guilty of a reckless violation of the ADEA, he has committed a willful violation and has to pay liq-
uidated damages.  29 U.S.C. § 626(b)–(c) (1988).  See Standard, supra note 182, at 41.  For a dis-
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costs. This goal was accomplished using “criticality” and “flexibility” 
criteria,263  which were not as obviously age-correlated as those used in 
City of Jackson.  The method of achieving the goal was to use subjective 
evaluations, however, and the criteria were shown to have a disparate 
impact on older employees.264  Such criteria could predictably be used to 
stereotype older employees as less flexible and less critical to the organi-
zation.265  In this case, the employer should have to show that subjec-
tively evaluating the candidates for RIF was a reasonable method of 
achieving the goal, which should require a showing that less discrimina-
tory alternatives were not available. 
If the employer has a legitimate goal and was not reckless in the 
methods he used to accomplish his goal—in other words, the criteria he 
used would not predictably affect the protected class negatively—then 
RFOA should be easier to prove.  Proof akin to business justification 
would be sufficient; the employer would have to show only that the se-
lection criterion was reasonably related to his legitimate goals.266  For 
example, in Walker v. City of Cabot,267 the plaintiff complained that the 
employer’s reduction in force disproportionately impacted the protected 
class.268  The employer’s justification was the need to eliminate redun-
dant positions to save money, which the court said was reasonable.  In 
the plaintiff’s case, the method of choosing him for the RIF involved re-
                                           
 263. Meacham II, 461 F.3d 134, 139 (2d Cir. 2006). 
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 268. Id. at *2. 
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turning his duties to the position from which they had been taken to cre-
ate his job.269  In such a case, neither the goal, eliminating redundant po-
sitions, nor the method of achieving the goal, reassigning job duties, ap-
pears to be correlated with age.   Thus, the employer has shown that his 
goal was legitimate and his method of accomplishing it was reasonable.  
In other words, the selection criterion was rationally related to the em-
ployer’s legitimate goal. 
In sum, the solution to the meaning of RFOA depends on identify-
ing those situations in which the defendant recklessly used a factor that is 
likely to discriminate.  If so, he should be held to a higher standard to 
prove RFOA.  Proof of the accidental use of a factor that has a disparate 
impact should require less onerous proof, similar to a business justifica-
tion. 
When will the employer be considered reckless?  What does this 
state of mind mean in this context?  To put the states of mind required 
for employment discrimination in context, disparate treatment discrimi-
nation requires intentional discrimination,270 while disparate impact dis-
crimination does not require proof of intentional discrimination.271  Dis-
parate impact requires only statistical proof that an employment criterion 
adversely affects the protected class.272 
The meaning of intent to discriminate under the anti-discrimination 
acts is akin to the purposeful or intentional state of mind in criminal 
law.273  The Court has recognized that reference to criminal states of 
mind is appropriate to describe recklessness in the discrimination con-
text.274  In addition, the criminal states of mind cover all the possibilities 
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 274. See Kolstad v. American Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 536 (1999) (equating the standard 
for punitive damages under Title VII with the standard for liquidated damages under the ADEA and 
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in this context and are capable of accurate definition.275  Thus, if the de-
fendant intends to do the act that brings about the statutorily proscribed 
result—for example, if he intends to treat people of another race differ-
ently because of their race—then the defendant has acted with specific 
intent comparable to purposefulness in criminal law.276  The Supreme 
Court has said that knowing that the criterion discriminates against per-
sons in a protected class is insufficient to prove intentional discrimina-
tion.277  The employer must be using the criterion with the intent to cause 
the discrimination.278  In other words, the employer must act with the 
purpose of discriminating.  If he acts only knowingly, which is doing the 
act knowing that the result is practically certain to occur, he is not guilty 
of intentional discrimination.279  In a disparate impact case, an employer 
imposing a criterion that he knows discriminates should not escape liabil-
                                                                                              
cited a criminal standard).  The Court looked at the standard for punitive damages developed under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983, which requires that the defendant’s conduct be shown to “be motivated by evil 
motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights 
of others.”  Id. at 537.  The minimum standard under § 1983 is recklessness, a “‘subjective con-
sciousness of a risk of injury or illegality and a ‘criminal indifference to civil obligations.’”  Id.  
(emphasis added).  The Court explained that criminal law employs this subjective form of reckless-
ness and requires that the defendant “disregards a risk of harm of which he is aware.”  Id.  Justice 
Stevens also invoked a criminal standard in his concurrence and dissent: 
The ADEA provides for an award of liquidated damages—damages that are “punitive in 
nature”—when the employer “knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of 
whether its conduct was prohibited by the statute.” 
 . . . In Thurston, we interpreted the ADEA’s standard the same way and explained 
that the relevant mental distinction between intentional discrimination and “reckless dis-
regard” for federally protected rights is essentially the same as the well-known difference 
between a “knowing” and a “willful” violation of a criminal law.  [W]hile a criminal de-
fendant, like an employer, need not have knowledge of the law to act “knowingly” or in-
tentionally, he must know that his acts violate the law or must “careless[ly] disregard 
whether or not one has the right so to act” in order to act “willfully.”  We interpreted the 
word “willfully” the same way in the civil context.  See McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe 
Co., 486 U.S. 128, 133, 108 S. Ct. 1677, 100 L.Ed.2d 115 (1988) (holding that the “plain 
language of the Fair Labor Standards Act’s “willful” liquidated damages standard re-
quires that “the employer either knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of 
whether its conduct was prohibited by the statute,” without regard to the outrageousness 
of the conduct at issue). 
527 U.S. at 548–49 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted). 
 275. See Standard, supra note 182, at 535. 
 276. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a);  see also Standard, supra note 182, at 534–35. 
 277. Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979). 
 278. Id.  In Feeney, the Court said, “‘[D]iscriminatory purpose,’ however, implies more than 
intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that the decisionmaker . . . se-
lected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ 
its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.”  Id. (citation omitted). 
 279. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b). 
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ity by simply interposing that criterion as an RFOA, however.280  City of 
Jackson is a good example of an employer acting knowingly.  The City 
must have known that using reverse seniority would impact the protected 
class.281 
Recklessness is the next less serious state of mind after knowledge.  
Recklessness requires a conscious disregard of a substantial risk that the 
statutorily proscribed result will occur.282  Meacham is an example of the 
employer acting recklessly.  Although the criteria used there (flexibility 
and criticality) are not as obviously age-related as those used in City of 
Jackson, the employer was reckless in combining those criteria with sub-
jective evaluations.  Although the employer may not be guilty of inten-
tional discrimination in either case, recklessness should suffice to elevate 
the burden of proving RFOA in a disparate impact case.283 
The question of whether the defendant has been reckless should be 
a jury question.  Again, the state of mind of recklessness is not unknown 
under the ADEA.  In order to find that the defendant is not guilty of a 
willful violation of the ADEA, which would foreclose the imposition of 
liquidated damages, the jury must find that the employer “incorrectly but 
in good faith and nonrecklessly believes that the statute permits a par-
ticular age-based decision . . . .”284 
The point of this article is that if the employer is acting with a suffi-
ciently culpable state of mind with regard to whether the criterion treats 
the protected class less favorably, he should not be able to interpose the 
criterion itself as a reasonable method of achieving his goals without fur-
ther justification.  Thus, if the employer is reckless with regard to wheth-
er the criterion discriminates, he should have to justify it by evidence that 
there were no reasonable alternatives.  If he has a less culpable state of 
                                           
 280. Knowledge is a more serious state of mind than recklessness.  Compare MODEL PENAL 
CODE § 2.02(2)(b) (defining knowledge), with MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (defining reckless-
ness). 
 281. “[R]everse seniority is almost inherently tied to the age of the employee, [and] such a 
reason necessarily is based on age and should lack legitimacy.”  Mack A. Player, Proof of Disparate 
Treatment Under the Age Discrimination In Employment Act: Variations on A Title VII Theme, 17 
GA. L. REV. 621, 656 (1983). 
 282. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c). 
 283. It could be argued that even if the employer is only grossly or criminally negligent, he 
should have to meet the higher standard to prove RFOA.  Under the Model Penal Code, recklessness 
requires that the employer be subjectively aware of risk; criminal negligence requires only that a 
reasonable person would be aware of the risk.  Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c), with 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d). 
 284. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 506 U.S. 604, 616–17 (1993). 
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mind, interposing a defense should not require as much proof, as long as 
the practice serves his legitimate employment goals.285 
The Court has developed a penchant for declaring employer prac-
tices reasonable without analysis.286  City of Jackson is emblematic of 
this problem.  There, the Court said that the use of seniority would al-
ways be reasonable without stopping to inquire how the employer used 
seniority.  The employer in fact used reverse seniority, which should 
never be considered reasonable without some justification.  This is espe-
cially troubling because in several cases, the Court has referred to the 
traditional use of seniority—to provide more benefits for greater senior-
ity—as one of the most important rights in employment, and it has pro-
tected seniority to the disadvantage of other federally protected employ-
ment rights.287   The Court’s proclivity for declaring employer practices 
reasonable without analysis must not continue.  Otherwise, the ADEA is 
in serious jeopardy, as are other anti-discrimination acts that afford simi-
lar protections. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The Court has held that the ADEA was designed to combat “inac-
curate and stigmatizing stereotypes.”288  If obviously age-correlated fac-
tors are considered reasonable, older employees can easily be discrimi-
nated against based on these stereotypes.  The courts that interpreted the 
ADEA shortly after its enactment almost uniformly recognized that using 
                                           
 285. ADEA cases are tried before a jury.  See Friedman, supra note 166, at 868.  Decisions 
regarding the defendant’s state of mind are virtually always entrusted to juries in serious criminal 
cases.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 286. In a case under Title VII, which requires reasonable accommodation without undue hard-
ship in religion cases, the Court said that the accommodation the employer offered, an unpaid leave, 
was reasonable and that the employer need not show that the accommodation requested by the em-
ployee was an undue hardship.  Ansonia v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 70 (1986).  Similarly, in TWA v. 
Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84–85 (1977), the Court decided that requiring the employer to bear more 
than a de minimis cost, violate the seniority system, burden other employees, or leave the employer 
shorthanded would all be undue hardships and thus not reasonable accommodations.  Id. at 84.  
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, which also requires reasonable accommodation without 
undue hardship, in US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 404–05 (2002), the Court said that 
overriding the seniority system to accommodate the plaintiff’s disability was not reasonable in the 
usual case.  The Court cited the standard for reasonable accommodation under the Title VII case of 
TWA v. Hardison, despite the fact that Congress had clearly said it was intending to set a more strin-
gent standard for the ADA.  Id. at 422 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Although the Court’s misinterpreta-
tion of congressional intent has recently required congressional action relating to the ADA, the pre-
amble to that Act did not refer to the Barnett case, and Congress was nevertheless clearly admonish-
ing the Court to pay attention to its prior intention of protecting disabled people.  ADA Amendments 
Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008).  To avoid congressional action regarding 
the ADEA, the Court should be more careful in following congressional intent in interpreting RFOA. 
 287. See discussion, supra note 228. 
 288. Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 610–611. 
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such criteria indicated an intention to discriminate against older employ-
ees.289  These courts were stating an obvious truth that the courts today 
are failing to see: If an employer chooses a criterion that so obviously 
discriminates against older people, he may very well be acting based on 
the stereotypes that the ADEA was designed to eradicate, that older peo-
ple are less competent, less trainable, resistant to change, less promo-
table, and expected to perform less ably.290  Especially in view of the fact 
that these myths have now been thoroughly debunked by the studies 
cited earlier,291 age-correlated criteria should be highly scrutinized, not 
lightly accepted as reasonable.  Even the Court in Hazen Paper, the case 
that started the trend to restrictively interpret the ADEA, said: 
We do not preclude the possibility that an employer who targets 
employees with a particular pension status on the assumption that 
these employees are likely to be older thereby engages in age dis-
crimination.  Pension status may be a proxy for age, not in the sense 
that the ADEA makes the two factors equivalent, but in the sense 
that the employer may suppose a correlation between the two fac-
tors and act accordingly.292 
Nevertheless, many courts have subsequently failed to accord any sig-
nificance to age-correlated criteria. 
Despite the Court’s recent decisions that have applied the disparate 
impact theory to the ADEA and put the burden of persuasion on the em-
ployer to prove the RFOA defense, older employees are still in danger of 
losing a large measure of protection under the ADEA.  Unless the defen-
dant is required to justify the use of factors that correlate so strongly with 
age that he can only be considered reckless, older employees may still be 
terminated because they have too much seniority, too much experience, 
are close to retirement, and make too much money.  These are the exact 
employer actions that the ADEA was enacted to prevent. 
The quote that introduced this article, to the effect that ageism is a 
pernicious problem in the workplace, ends as follows, and I want to end 
on a hopeful note, as well: 
Nevertheless, older Americans in great numbers continue to work.  
And as they continue to succeed in their jobs, we become increas-
ingly hopeful for the future.  As greater numbers of older Ameri-
cans continue to break the negative stereotypes toward older indi-
viduals that exist in our society, we feel confident that societal per-
                                           
 289. See supra cases cited in note 154. 
 290. See Cuddy & Fiske, supra note 48, at 18. 
 291. See supra text accompanying notes 47–57. 
 292. Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 613 (citation omitted). 
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ceptions will gradually shift, as well.  After all, older Americans are 
not just reminders of our past; they are also our future.293 
                                           
 293. See McCann & Giles, supra note 1, at 188. 
